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The Prospects for Defense Cooperation in the Persian Gulf:
Saudi Arabia's Continuing Search for Security
1.0 Introduction: What Are the Issues Facing the Gulf?
Political stability and military security are the two pressing
contemporary concerns of the Persian Gulf countries. 1  Owing to the oil and
natural gas resources in this region, the fate of these countries is of
critical importance to the Western industrial states and the Soviet Union.
"Stability" and "security" in the Gulf are also of primary concern in the
West, particularly in the United States. Yet these concepts are understood
differently in the West than in the Gulf. For the West, the fundamental issue
is the guarantee and security of its access to Gulf oil. However, the
fundamental interest for the Arab states in the Gulf area is the stability and
security, i.e., the survival and continued reign, of the governing regimes of
those states. In fact, the common fear is that political instability in any
one country may lead to a rapid and violent transformation of the
socio-economic structure of all Gulf countries.
The differences in these views have led to different approaches in
deterring and managing conflict. US options, for example, have focused on the
threat of a Soviet military invasion of the Gulf area intended either to
occupy the oil fields or to assert a sufficiently strong regional presence as
to command irresistable political influence over the Gulf oil producing
-2-
nations. Thus, the US response has tended to emphasize unilateral
countermeasures in the form of a rapid deployment force (RDF). The missions
of this force have varied over time depending on the particular threat
scenario which is assumed.2
The Gulf countries, on the other hand, perceive their military security
needs in a different way, because they perceive the threats from a different
perspective. They too almost universally fear Soviet incursions into the Gulf
area. Almost as universally, the Gulf countries implicitly rely on US resolve
to deter and to blunt any such Soviet designs. Yet, American pronunciations
of its security interests in the region have prompted Arab reservations about
being too closely identified with the US. In addition, Gulf states perceive
instabilities induced by domestic and regional conflicts to be greater and
more probable threats to Gulf security.
1.1 The Scope of the Problem
Arrangements for security in the Gulf can reflect either external,
regional or internal (domestic) perspectives, or some combination thereof. A
broad literature is currently available on US and Soviet security interests in
the Gulf, especially, for example, dealing with the RDF.3  This paper will
primarily examine current efforts to develop security arrangements based on
institutions of regional cooperation in the Gulf. A secondary, but important,
issue is the relationship between these regional efforts and external.,
especially Western, states.
Specifically, propositions will be developed in this paper addressing the
purpose of, and the potential for, contemporary regional security cooperation
in the Gulf. Because it is the current framework of cooperation emerging
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there, this discussion will focus on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and
its potential role as a security institution. No predictions about the future
development of the GCC in particular are attempted. However, on the basis of
the current political environment, the scope and limits of contemporary
regional security cooperation in the Gulf are analyzed. What can we say about
the purposes of defense cooperation in the region? How are the purposes
related to contemporary political interests, regional political conflict and
actual military capabilities? What obstacles, if any, will undermine the
possibilities of defense integration? These conclusions, which will be
presented in the form of propositions, have policy relevance for such issues
as an American RDF or the search for basing rights in the Gulf area. However,
such discussion would require an analysis of regional history and bilateral
diplomatic relations which exceeds the narrower scope of this study.
1.2 Analytic Framework and Issue Background
Before outlining these propositions, it is appropriate to say something
about the GCC and about the methodology used here to discuss it. Four points
are relevant.
First, one can delineate the nature of the threats posed to the Gulf
governments as: internal , regional and extra-regional threats. Internal
threats refer mainly to subversive activities which reflect disputes intrinsic
to the political or social structures. Anti-monarchial sentiment can, for
example, be expressed by a newly emerging class of upwardly mobile, educated
technocrats with growing social and political demands and expectations. Or,
it could be inspired by a foreign power with the intent of destabilizing the
government by, for example, taking advantage of standing religious strife
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between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Regional threats result from regional
interstate competition to achieve regional domination or sufficient strength
to deter other's attempts to assert domination in any of a number of
regionally important issue areas. Finally, extra-regional threats involve
attempts of foreign extra-regional powers to gain influence in the outcomes of
regional policymaking processes by force or coercion. Clearly, the policy
preferences of the external power in this case would not converge with those
of the regional target state; otherwise, no "threat" would be perceived. Note
that there is great overlap among these three categories. Although an attempt
to distinguish between two of these three categories may be difficult in any
particular scenario, it still is analytically useful to analyze conflict in
this way.
Second, the emergence and role of the GCC will be cast in the context of
previous efforts to organize a Gulf security system. Each proposal for
coordinating security policies and defense maneuvers reflected the sponsor's
particular needs and perceived threat environment. The emphasis here is on
the needs and perceived threats which led up to the current framework of
cooperation, i.e., the GCC.
This leads to a third point, that the discussion in the paper reflects a
heavy emphasis on political developments and threat perceptions from 1979 to
present. Thus, we begin with the assumption that the Islamic Revolution in
Iran and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan together
induced a systemic transformation in the Gulf. That is, political interests,
security needs and opportunities for deterring and managing conflict in the
Gulf changed for regional and external actors for reasons endemic to those
events.
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The justification for this assumption derives from the evolution of
regional conflict management over the last two decades. 4 Three periods are
relevant. (i) Prior to the British withdrawal from the region in 1971, all
interstate and much intrastate conflict was frozen by the presence of British
political administration and military strength. External intervention was
deterred; territorial claims were settled by the British; disturbances were
suppressed.
(ii) After 1971, indirect forms of superpower intervention became
dominant practice. US defense support of Iran and Saudi Arabia grew. The US
Navy held exercises from its ports and bases in Bahrain and Oman. The USSR,
on the other hand, developed close relations with Iraq. US-Soviet competition
in the region remained indirect.
(iii) The current period reveals changes in intra-regional state
relations, superpower relations vis-a-vis the Gulf, and superpower-regional
client state relations. Specifically, the Iranian Revolution raised the
dangers of internal instabilities in the states of the region by enhancing the
relationship between internal and regional threats. This means that domestic
disturbances, whether inspired by religious disputes or by the political
demands of non-native populations, for example, posed new challenges to the
security and survival of a state's ruling family. Indeed, this was the direct
cause of the Shah's fall from power. That model of political change was
perceived by the Gulf's ruling families as a direct threat. In addition,
inspiring such internal disturbances has become a distinct typology for
interstate relations in the Gulf, e.g., Khomeini's call for Shia uprisings in
Bahrain.
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In this atmosphere, the superpowers themselves have become more directly
competitive. In a destabilized region, more opportunities are available for
exploiting local and regional events. Such possibilities have been among US
fears of Soviet involvement in the Gulf, especially following Afghanistan.
Without strong and stable partners or client states in the region, a state
like the US believes it necessary to play a more direct role in managing
regional events. Only in this way, such a view implies, can the US make
certain that political events and conflict in the region do not threaten
critical national interests. Indeed, this is the basis for the US RDF or for
US promises to keep open the Strait of Hormuz.
Finally, superpower and regional relations have changed. The absence of
regional buffers (a role played by the Shah's Iran) increases the likelihood
of superpower confrontation over local disputes. Equivalently, political
mechanisms for decoupling local instabilities from direct superpower
confrontation are unavailable. Thus, tensions are introduced into the
political relationships between a superpower (e.g., the US) and a regional
client state/ally (e.g., Saudi Arabia). The primary concern for the
superpower becomes securing its interests in the region (oil) and minimizing
the gains of the other superpower. For the regional ally, its primary
concern- regime survival- may not always imply a convergence of interests with
its superpower ally. This is, by and large, the Arab Gulf understanding of
why the US did not save the Shah.
Two results are apparent. (a) Until a new "regional buffer" is in place,
such tensions are likely to persist. In fact, it should be realized that such
tensions might well be reflected in the development of a new regional buffer.
This is the perspective from which to view the GCC dictum of "no foreign
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bases" and "no foreign pacts" (although these serve purely rhetorical
functions as well). (b) Efforts to create a new buffer have intensified at
least one superpower-regional relationship: the US and Saudi Arabia. This
development parallels the unilateral assertion of new military postures, e.g.,
the RDF. Since 1979, the US military role in Saudi Arabia has taken on a new
dimension. From infrastructure support and arms transfers, the Americans
assumed direct training and advisory roles, including assisting in combat
(training) maneuvers and military missions and developing contingency plans. 5
The structure of the current period leads to the fourth and final point.
This paper will focus on Saudi Arabia as a means for narrowing the discussion,
but still treating the important political themes. (Other countries will be
discussed, but not with the same emphasis). This is appropriate for a number
of reasons. First, it is larger, wealthier and more heavily invested in arms
procurement than other Gulf countries. Also, Saudi Arabia is the main force
behind current efforts to coordinate regional security plans. Indeed,
conclusions of the paper suggest that the GCC is an independent variable in
Saudi defense planning; ie., the GCC is a vehicle for Saudi Arabia's search
for security. Finally, Saudi Arabia is critically important to the West.
This importance has increased since the Iranian Revolution, during a time when
the Saudi political system is thought (at least in the West) to be less
capable of tolerating domestic and regional instability. Therefore, as the
relative military weakness of Saudi Arabia is magnified, the stability of the
interdependencies between the West and Saudi Arabia becomes more uncertain.
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1.3 Regional Security and the GCC: Propositions
The main hypothesis developed in this paper is that the fundamental
purpose of the GCC security framework is to counteract the current linkage
between internal (domestic) and regional threats. At best, the linkage could
be fractured, which would imply the political inability of regional actors to
exploit successfully local instabilities. At a minimum, however, the purpose
of the GCC security framework is to permit the Saudi's to cope_ with the
linkage between internal and regional threats.
This objective is important for two reasons. First, mutual regime
support within the GCC framework is enhanced. Given the goal of regime
survival, it is essential to preclude the possibility that internal and
regional threats become challenges to the political survival of a ruling
family. Second, by establishing a form of regional management of conflict,
opportunities and incentives for external intervention are substantially
reduced.
If this hypothesis is true, then several deductions follow. These
deductions will take the form of propositions which will be analyzed. First,
an obvious prescription for dealing with intra-state instabilities is to
improve internal security functions. Inter-state coordination of police
functions, e.g. information sharing, extradition laws, etc., might be
especially important within a GCC-like framework. These actions would have
the effect of placing a "cap" on criminal or political activities which might
have implications for regime stability. Indeed, it will be demonstrated that
the current "security" basis of the GCC focuses on internal security measures.
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A second component of decoupling internal and regional threats is to
reduce the incentive for military strikes or other hostile actions between
states. This is accomplished by reducing the perceived benefits, or
increasing the potential costs, of such action. Thus, the deduction is that
we expect to see regional states acquiring stronger defensive capabilities in
order to deter regional aggression, which might otherwise be "invited" by the
absence of military strength. This statement may seem obvious, but a
proposition can be drawn from it which is not so readily apparent.
It will be seen that Saudi Arabia is engaged in a massive arms
acquisition program, far exceeding the arms programs in other Gulf countries
in magnitude and sophistication. The expansion of these bilateral relations
with the US is a parallel but complementary development to Saudi Arabia's
involvement in the GCC. The proposition is that there is a fundamental
connection between these two developments. That is, future coordinated GCC
defense plans and capabilities are tied to the current Saudi modernization
program and, therefore, to the availability of US arms and technical support.
A simple example of why this is the case, as will be seen, involves the
creation of an air defense system for GCC countries. Early radar warning and
quick reaction interceptor aircraft are two essential components of an air
defense network. Yet, to use these assets, a command, control and
communications structure must be in place. The quick reaction time
requirements at each stage of an intercept, especially in the Gulf, imply a
high degree of personnel coordination and systems compatibility across the
entire Gulf region.
One implication of this proposition is that progress in defense
coordination in the GCC partially depends on the willingness of member states
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to develop a close association with the US in order to expand and restructure
its military forces. For a nation like Kuwait, this may present a serious
political dilemma. Permitting the broad range of social contact and economic
penetration by the US, which would inevitably result from sophisticated arms
transfers, communications equipment, training and maintenance, is a
politically unpalatable option for Kuwait. Oman and Saudi Arabia, on the
othler hand, have a close defense association with the US. Although they too
are concerned about "appearances," their different attitude concerning an
association with the US almost certainly is raising political obstacles to the
realization of a GCC defense agreement.
The efforts to compensate for these political differences in Gulf
diplomacy revolve around the themes of consensus building and legitimacy: what
instruments serve the end of causing Gulf states to perceive interests which
are close and converging to those of the other Arab Gulf states? Consensus
serves those within the alliance framework, here referring to the GCC.
Legitimacy, however, is a broader issue, relating to historical precedent,
ethical and moral considerations (an important theme in Islam), and
perceptions about the alliance by outsiders. These issues of consensus and
legitimacy will reappear throughout the discussion.
This paper will begin with an examination of internal and regional threat
perceptions in the Gulf. From there we will consider the historical dimension
of coordinated security planning in the region. The GCC will enter the
discussion in this section. Finally, profiles of the military status of the
GCC states will follow.
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2.0 Threat Perceptions in the Gulf
There are three major powers bordering the Gulf: Iran, Iraq and Saudi
Arabia. The first two are fighting a grueling war which will undoubtedly have
a major effect on the future of their development just as it dramatically is
affecting current intra-Gulf relations. The Saudis are organizing a
confederation of lower Gulf states to deal with economic and defense issues.
To understand how a security arrangement might emerge in that region, it is
important to understand threat perceptions as seen by the local nations.
Surely this is a necessary base on which to judge the success of a Gulf
security regime in addressing or resolving conflict, or the failure of that
regime owing to its incapacity to resolve conflict.
Three major factors influence Saudi Arabia's world position in the 1980s.
Saudi Arabia occupies a strategic geographical location. Its borders on the
Red Sea and Persian Gulf place it in direct contact with some of the most
strategic trade routes connecting Europe and Southwest Asia. Sixty percent of
the world's oil supplies travel through the Gulf en route to the world's
industrialized nations. Its proximity to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean
emphasize its domination, together with India, of the exposed southern flank
of the USSR.
As the world's principal exporter of crude oil, Saudi Arabia plays a
pivotal role in the availability and pricing of energy supplies and therefore
in the politics of an international energy regime. Finally, two of Islam's
holy sites, Mecca and Medina, are located in Saudi Arabia. The central
importance of Saudi Arabia's self-perceived role as "guardian of Islam" should
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not be underestimated. Annual pilgramages bring at least hundreds of
thousands of foreign Moslems to Saudi Arabia. Its central role in the
fulfilment of basic Islamic duties is widely recognized.
2.1 Internal Stability
Internal threats originate in basically two ways which overlap
extensively: in the governmental domain from competing political parties and
demographically from culturally or religiously diverse populations.
The Saudi government and society embody a number of contradictions.
Saudi society is rapidly developing. Yet, the Saudi government is a monarchy.
Although the government includes a number of ministries charged with
overseeing technological progress, the monarchy retains many of its original
tribal traditions and combines the traditional roles of religious and tribal
leadership.6 The monarch is imam and guardian of the holy cities Mecca and
Medina, leader of the tribal shaykhs and king of the nation. The Qu'ran
serves as the constitution of Saudi Arabia and the Shari'a, codified Islamic
law, as its legal code. Thus, the king has final responsibility for all
executive, legislative and judicial governmental functions.
The nature of the Saudi contradictions focuses on the conflict between
managing the rapid social changes resulting from the (desired) high-paced
economic development programs and retaining the traditional religious, tribal,
feudal structure of political and social relations. Some evidence of such
contradiction is found in the debates in govenment between fundamentalists who
want to restore the religious and moral role of Islam and the materialists who
wish to maintain the high economic growth. Each group sees the other as a
primary threat. The very form of Saudi government, dynastic rule, sets Al
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Saud, the inner ruling coterie within the House of Saud, in possible
conflict with the emerging interests and expectations of the new, educated,
technocratic middle class of Saudi Arabia. The existence of such conflict in
Saudi society reflects the existence of a diversity of interest groups in the
society. Specifically, these groups include policymakers representing the
royal family and the technocrats, the military, the tribes, the 'ulema and the
educated.8
The royal family, including some 4000 princes, dominates Saudi domestic
and foreign policymaking. These princes are placed at all important levels of
the ministries, including especially those dealing with security issues,
foreign relations, commerce and technology. Indeed, the presence of
technically or managerially competent people, inside or outside the royal
family but clearly in the policymaking arena, arguably constitutes a separate
9interest group. With this size, it is clear that there have been and will
continue to be divisions within the royal family. 10 The difficulty of
assessing the impact of division within the royal family on Saudi unity and
stability is indicative of the poor state of knowledge concerning royal family
decision processes. However, informal consultations between the royal family
and other interest groups, notably the tribes and the 'ulema, serve as a
consensus building mechanism to win or maintain broad-based support for royal
policies.
Even in modern Saudi Arabia, the tribal tradition is evident. 11  The
attempts to build and maintain a consensus among the tribes have reinforced
the traditional structure of authority and the perception that the Saudi
monarchs are "tribal overlords." This process has, in effect, been one of
"transferring the loyalty of the Bedouin from the tribe to the nation.1"12
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The result is structured patterns of coalition and alliance formation and
dissolution similar to those found in industrial societies. 13
Part of maintaining the tribal allegiance is the role of Islam. The full
unification of religious values and the state creates a niche for the 'ulema,
the Islamic clergy or religious scholars. The opinion of the 'ulema reflects
their role in unifying the population and legitimizing the political rule. 14
The 'ulema figures prominently in the Ministry of Justice and advised the
attack to end the occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca in November 1979.
Thus, Al Saud and the 'ulema together constitute the "intregrating mechanism"
unifying Islam and the Saudi state:
The Islamic system of Saudi Arabia is a close, real and practical
expression of the General Will. The locus of legitimacy is not to be
found in the people; instead, the Good Society (which Saudis as good
Muslims wish to create) emerges through a leadership imbued with Islamic
values and a society governed by Islamic law and teachings. In short, the
totality and coherence of Islam is so ingrained in Saudi culture that it
still serves as a potent integrating mechanism.15
The unity of faith and state is the foundation of Saudi perceptions of
their position in the world and, as such, a real guide to policy. For
example, Saudi money is often used to enhance the role of Islam in other
Moslem states and to fight secularization: "In both the domestic and
international arenas, therefore, Islam is far more than a mere rhetorical
subject for the ruling elite. It pervades social customs and interactions.
It dominates images and attitudes. It motivates policies and is used to
justify them. And it embodies the system of values upon which the legitimacy
of the regime rests." 16
Iran and Iraq have significantly different political structures answering
to different interest groups. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein simultaneously
holds several posts which unify the country's political power and
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decision-making authority in himself. He is President of the Republic,
secretary-general of the ruling Ba'ath Socialist Party in Iraq, chairman of
Iraq's highest executive and legislative body, the Revolutionary Command
Council and commander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed forces.17 Competing
political parties are legal and active. The Progressive National Front, the
Kurds and the Iraqi Communist Party are the three main political organizations
besides the Ba'athist Party. The issue with such interest groups is not so
much power sharing per se, because short of overthrowing the Ba'ath, no such
arrangements are possible given the current structure of government. Factors
related to security policymaking, or most other policy, are not matters of
public discussion.18 Rather, of particular interest here is the role of
these groups in potentially undermining the Hussein regime's stability.
However, this relates more directly to the activities of the different
populations in Iraq, rather than the parties roles of political participation
in the government.
Theological authoritarianism is now the form of government in Iran. The
revolution which brought the Ayatollah Khomeini to power reflected the
cleavages in Iranian society created by what the Islamic clergy saw as the
evils perpetrated by the Shah: foreign domination, despotism and
injustice. 19 The Shah's agrarian reform did not check the industrialization
of agriculture and the consequent rise in rural unemployment. Iran's economic
modernization program created a skewed consumer society benefitting the
already privileged. High military expenditures, recession and rapid erosion
of traditional and religious values all contributed to the broad coalition
which in 1978 brought down the Shah's regime.
The movement which grew into the Islamic Revolution included leftist,
ethnic and religious groups. The National Front consisted of Mossadeq
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nationalists; the People's Mujahedeen were progressive Moslems; and the
People's Fedayeen were Marxist-Leninist in orientation. Kurds, Arabs,
Baluchis and Turkomans were among the ethnic groups aspiring for greater
autonomy. However, it was Khomeini and the Shi'ite clergy, whose mullahs are
closely identified with individual mosques and communities in Iran 20, who
shaped the basis of the Revolution. They grounded their demands for the
removal of the Shah in calls for the reunification of social values with
fundamental Shi'ite Islamic values.
During the first year of the Revolution, Khomeini worked through secular
governments to consolidate the political power in the hands of the clergy. 21
By the middle of 1981, Bani-Sadr fled Iran and the crisis of national
instability seemed to make counter-revolution inevitable. 22 The
Mujahedeen-al-Khalq declared a policy of armed resistance against Khomeini.
Its attacks on the Islamic Republican Party headquarters in June 1981 killed
over 70 top IRP members, including Khomeini's "ablest politician and
strategist," Ayatollah Mohamed Beheshti. 23 The government countered the
guerilla campaign of assassinations, bombings and open counter-revolutionary
combat by immediately replacing assassinated Islamic leaders, holding
presidential and parliamehtary elections and using the Revolutionary Guards as
a counter-terrorist force to destroy the Mujahedeen. Thousands of Mujahedeen
members and suspected members were executed or imprisoned. 24 By February
1982, the Mujahedeen ceased to be an effective source of resistance.
Elections of the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) gave the IRP a large
majority of the 270 seats. No Kurds, communist Tudeh party members,
Mujahedeen or leftist Fedayeens won seats.25 With the clergy in full
control of executive and legislative functions, the full Islamic
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transformation of Iran began.26 In April 1982, the Supreme Court revoked
all "un-Islamic" laws and clerical judges took over administration of the
courts. Owing to the bloody history of SAVAK, the Shah's internal security
apparatus, the Majlis had displayed for some time a reluctance to support the
creation of a new intelligence ministry, even in light of the
counter-revolutionary threats. 27 Contrary evidence that intelligence bodies
were indeed organized, possibly in conjunction with the Revolutionary
Guards, 28 complements our knowledge of the komitehs, vigilante groups
organized as neighborhood surveillance and police committees. Their functions
ranged from maintaining law and order and delivering social services to combat
with the counter-revolutionary Mujahedeen. By 1983, over 6100 komitehs were
active throughout Iran, "encompassing many of Iran's villages and
neighborhoods."29
This survey of the three main regional governments underscores their
concern for stability and consolidation of political power. Perhaps more
important than a resume of power relations in government on the question of
internal stability and security are the longstanding conflicts and diverse
populations indigenous to the Gulf region. Focusing on the demographically
based conflicts contributes directly to an understanding of the sources of
regional conflict.
Another important division in the Gulf is that between Sunni and Shia
Moslems. A doctrinal dispute following the death of the Prophet Mohammed in
632 split Islam into the orthodox Sunni and the unorthodox Shias. The dispute
originally centered on a question of Mohammed's successor. 30 It broadened
with the Shia becoming the focus for disaffected ethnic groups and dissidents
in Arab society.31 Sunnis constitute the majority of Moslems, particularly
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in the Arab countries. Thus, they represent the mainstream, in thought and
custom, of Islamic society. Shi'ites, historically the persecuted ethnic
minority, have tended to occupy the lowest economic classes throughout the
Gulf area regardless of nationality. 32 Shia constitutes the main belief
system in Iran and has a significant following in Iraq and other Gulf
countries.
Extremist movements have marked both Sunni and Shia sects. Shia
extremism in historical and contemporary times protested its imposed social
and economic deprivation. 33  However, Shia extremism may also reflect the
Shia doctrine of the imamate. One day, according to the doctrine, a hidden
imam, an infallible leader who is a descendant of Ali, 34 will reappear to
establish the realm of justice. Sunni extremism, on the other hand, usually
advocates doctrinal purity, anti-corruption and sometimes anti-Westernism.
The Moslem Brotherhood is an example of Sunni-inspired extremism. Both Sunni
and Shia extremists use violence as a means of achieving objectives; both seek
to protect their understanding of traditional Islamic values from competing
Western influences.
The historical relationship between Sunni and Shia beliefs offers the
underlying explanation fo the widespread fear among Arab Gulf countries
during and following the rise to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The central
concern is to maintain stability of the Sunni-dominated regimes in the Gulf
area from Khomeini-inspired Shia uprisings. The dispersion of significant
Shia populations in Sunni-dominated countries (and a significant- over 40%-
Sunni minority in Shia-dominated Iran) makes this goal of stability
problematic.
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The Shia constitute a majority in Iraq. Their grievances stem from Sunni
domination of governmental institutions since the 1958 revolution and
socioeconomic discrimination in the Ba'athist-Sunni dominated business and
professional sectors. 3 5 In addition, Shia civil unrest in the holy cities
of Karbala and Najaf indicate religious grievances as well.
Many of the tradesmen and merchants in the lower Gulf are Shia Moslems of
Iranian origin. This group comprises 30-40% of the Kuwaiti population, 75% in
Bahrain, 20% in Abu Dhabi, 30% in Dubai, 20% in Qatar and 50% in Oman. While
the percent of Shia in Saudi Arabia is much smaller, they are the largest
minority in the Kingdom. They number over 275,000, but more critically are
concentrated in Qatif and al-Hasa, both in the eastern and most important oil
producing provinces. Thus, their labor contributes significantly to the Saudi
oil industry and Eastern Province industrial development projects. In
addition, there are thousands of Iranian emigres who, although not counted as
native population, are resident aliens. 36
The significance of the Shia populations in the Arab Gulf countries is,
of course, related to the Iranian revolution. Despite a Sunni minority in
Iran of around 40% including Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs and Azerbaijanis, the
Khomeini-led revolution and government is dominated by the Shia Persian
majority. Significantly, the pattern of civil and socioeconomic
discrimination there has mirrored the Shia-Sunni history in other Gulf
countries. Throughout the Gulf, Khomeini's success inspired Shias, convincing
them that their interests would be served by the spreading Shia influence from
Tehran.37 Indeed, it is claimed that part of the success of the revolution
was to sharpen the perceptions among the Shia communities in Arab countries of
being suppressed by the Sunni rulers, while simultaneously creating the
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"entirely unprecedented feeling of belonging to the potentially winning
side."38
Thus Shia unrest and uprisings in the Arab states created much anxiety in
those governments. In Iraq, violent demonstrations at the Shia shrines in
Najef and Karbala in 1979 paralleled similar disturbances in 1977. The 1979
episodes, however, were responses to Iranian incitement of the Arab Shia
communities to revolt against the Sunni (and in Iraq, secular)
governments. 39 Shi'ite demonstrations also occurred in Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain and Kuwait. 40 In the Saudi case, demonstrations followed Iranian
radio broadcasts- in the name of the Arabian Liberation Front.41  A stronger
tradition of Sunni-Shia disputes in Kuwait and Bahrain led to new outbreaks of
violence, again at the behest of radio broadcasts and mosque sermons.
Such urgings by the Iranian clerics constitute a paradoxical policy on
the part of the Iranians. Although Khomeini stressed the unifying role of
Islam for the entire Middle East regardless of Sunni and Shia distinctions
(despite his public statements against Saddam Hussein), many of the public
statements coming from Iran clearly made that distinction. Of course, this
reflects the strongly anti-monarchial and anti-secular sentiments of Khomeini
and his associates. 4 2  However, the ends to be served by the unity of the
Moslem world are to oppose imperialism and, by implication, the agents of
imperialism. It is that connection which poses the inherent dangers to the
regional monarchial and secular regimes by the Iranian Revolution. 43
Religious inspired instability extends beyond the Sunni-Shia disputes.
Indeed, Shia activity complements Sunni extremism as well, in the form of
orthodox Sunni reaction to the modernization and pro-Western policies of the
Sunni monarchies. The Moslem Brotherhood has already been mentioned. The
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Mecca Grand Mosque incident in 1979 in Saudi Arabia characterizes the dangers
of Sunni extremism.
In this incident, hundreds of armed Wahhabi fundamentalists44 carried
out an attack on the Masjid al-Haram (the Holy or Grand Mosque). The
attackers were led by Juhaiman ibn Saif of the Utaibah tribe, which plays an
important role in the Saudi internal security (National Guard) forces. 45
The entire group consisted of a number of distinct subgroups. 46 Those from
the Utaibah reportedly were angered by the expropriation of their land near
al-Taif by the Deputy Commander of the Saudi National Guard. Other subgroups
included: the al-Mushttarin sect which broke away from Wahhabism in the late
1920s and espoused a more puritanical form of Islam than Wahhabism; Bedouins;
members of the Muslim Brotherhood who, reviving the Najdi-Hijazi rivalry, want
autonomy for their region; some Shias from North and South Yemen; Egyptians
linked with the Muslim Brotherhood; and some Kuwaitis. The breadth of this
group and the fact that they occupied the Mosque for two weeks suggest a high
degree of coordination and training. In addition, their possession of weapons
suggests a connection with Saudi military sources or outside agents., perhaps
Soviet-backed nations.47
The statements of these fundamentalists carried a religious demand48
and a broad criticism of the Saudi regime. Al Saud was denounced for its
"impure Islam," and for moving away from the Wahhabi ethic while pursuing
economic modernization. 49 They called for the elimination of all
Westernism, from television to ties with infidel states, and challenged Al
Saud's legitimacy on the grounds of vast corruption in the Royal Family.50
In addition to the Mosque seizure, sketchy evidence is available that there
were plans for simultaneous uprisings at a Medina shrine and an oil field
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employing foreign workers. 51
The seriousness of this challenge to the government is indicated by the
breadth of the occupying force's composition, the publicity-seeking
interpretation of the event by leftist groups as being a prelude to popular
uprising, and the quick reactions of the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia,
to introduce reforms to re-assert a commitment to Islam.52
In addition to religious problems, the predominance of foreign nationals
and ethnic minorities in the Arab countries creates potential for instability.
Kurds still fight against Iraq and Iran for historically claimed autonomy. 53
Large foreign workforces, including Iranian Shias, potentially radical
Palestinians and non-Islamic nationals pose different kinds of threats to Gulf
countries whose native populations may be in the minority. The United Arab
Emirates are a prime example: of a population of 877,000, only around 200,000
are UAE citizens. 54 In Saudi Arabia also concern about foreign nationals
extends throughout the government. Forty to fifty percent of the Saudi
workforce is foreign. See Table 1. Half of Jidda's one million residents are
thought to be alien; and the 60,000 strong Saudi military is nearly matched in
numbers by foreign advisers and technicians. 55 Fears of strikes and
sabotage in the oil fieldS and erosion of Islamic values have led to
crackdowns and tighter controls on the influx and movement of resident
aliens.56
Although the data are unreliable, Palestinians are known to make up a
large body of foreign nationals in the lower Gulf countries. One estimate,
which does not report its primary sources, claims that Palestinians comprise
20% of the Kuwaiti population, 22% in Qatar (more than native born Qataris),
30% in the UAE and about 110,000 in Saudi Arabia. 57 However, for raw data,
Table 1
Migrant Workers in Gulf Countries
1970, 1975, 1980
Saudi Arabia
(1) 1970:
Palest-
Jordanian
Arab
non-Arab
50,000?
345,000?
n.a.
Kuwait
41.,299
UAE
6640
Qatar
n.a.
121,939 35,450 24,000?
53,500 8819 16,090?
Bahrain Oman
2000? n.a.
15,600? 2000?
6000? 3000?
(II) 1975:
Palest-
Jordanian
Arab
Total
175,000
699,900
773,400
47,653 14,500 6000
143,280 62,000 14,870
208,001 251,900 53,714
(III) 1975:
National
Arab/non-
nati onal
Foreign
(IV) Saudi
50%
n.a.
50%
Arabia only:
National
(%)
Nonnat'l
(%)
Total
employment
I. Nazli Choucri and Peter Brecke (1983), "Migration in the Middle East:
Transformation and Change," Middle East Review, Winter 1983/84, Vol.
XVI, No. 2, p. 18. "?" denotes rough estimate. Data for UAE is from
1968, for Bahrain 1971 and for Oman 1973.
II. Ibid., pp. 20-21.
III. Abdelwahab Bouhdiba (1979), "Arab Migrations," in Arab Industrialization
and Economic Integration, Roberto Aliboni (ed.), (New York: St.
Martin's), p. 172. This table is "Distribution of Foreigners and
Nationals % of Total Economically Active Population."
IV. Business International (1981), Saudi Arabia: Issues for Growth, New York.
614
4200
29,201
1600
8800
70,700
25.4%
51.7%
22.9%
43%
n.a.
57%
17%
n.a.
83%
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
62.9%
n.a.
37.1%
19801975
1,445,880
(66.6%)
723,400
(33.3%)
2,169,280
1,723,480
(62.7%)
1.,023,580
(37.3%)
2,747,060
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see Table 1. Most Palestinians in Saudi Arabia live and work in the eastern
oil provinces, also the home of most Saudi Shias. This created concern in
Saudi Arabia about potential subversion initiated by Iranian-PLO cooperation.
Although the possibilities for such cooperation now seem limited, the
potential for Palestinian incitement of political strife still exists in the
minds of Saudi leaders.58 Only tight controls have kept Palestinian
populations in Bahrain, Iraq and Oman at lower levels.
2.2 Regional Conflict
Regional relations are closely related to those factors affecting
internal stability. Shia demonstrations against Sunni discrimination can
quickly take on a dimension characterizing the state of Saudi-Iranian
relations, for example. Internal stability factors do not necessarily
dominate regional relations, however. Iraqi-Saudi competition is more a
function of the competition of economic and military power attending the
ascension of one of these states to a leadership role in the Gulf. This
section will consider the general factors surrounding Gulf security, e.g.,
border disputes, competition for resources.5 9  In addition, more specific
cases will be discussed: Saudi relations with the lower Gulf countries,
relations between the lower Gulf countries themselves, and Iranian and Iraqi
relations in the region.
2.2.1 Classes of Regional Disputes
Three classes of Gulf disputes can be distinguished. They include
boundary disputes and the nearly indistinguishable competition for economic
resources, dynastic competition and the regional struggle between "radical"
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and "conservative" political regimes.60 These disputes are expressed and
must be resolved in an environment of intense regional rivalry enhanced by the
magnitude of economic power which the Gulf states now enjoy. Added dimensions
affecting these disputes are the Arab-Israeli conflict and the global
superpower competition underlying the superpower relations with the Gulf
countries.
There are numerous outstanding boundary disputes within the Gulf. These
disputes are historic and reflect political competition owing to religious and
tribal differences, and economic competition related to access to mineral
resources and land and water rights in the region. The nature of boundary
disputes has changed since the 1950s to focus on questions of sovereignty over
strategically located islands and border areas and, of course, petroleum
rights. Boundary disputes in the old Trucial States (now the UAE) which
interfered with oil drilling operations were often resolved by British
mediation. In fact, of some 35-40 boundary disputes ongoing in the
1950s-1960s, British representatives proposed around 25 solutions which
ultimately were accepted by the involved parties.61 Current border disputes
in the Gulf include those between: 62
-Saudi Arabia and Kuwait over their maritime boundary;
-Saudi Arabia and Southern Yemen over their lengthy, undemarcated
boundary, especially in the al-Wadi'a area where armed clashes have
occurred;
-Saudi Arabia and Oman over the Umm Zamul oasis and the undemarcated
border in the northern part of the Rub' al-Khali desert;
-Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the sovereignty of the island of Sanafir in
the Straits of Tiran which reverted to Egyptian control under the Camp
David Accords despite the Saudi claim of sovereignty;
-Iraq and Iran over their maritime frontier in the Shatt al-'Arab which
was temporarily settled by Iraq and the Shah in the 1975 Algiers Accord,
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at a time of Iranian military supremacy. This agreement later became the
focal point of Iraqi discontent, when Iraq declared the Algiers agreement
null and void just prior to its invasion of Iran;
-Iraq and Syria over control and use of the Euphrates River;
-Iraq and Kuwait over their common frontier and control over the
strategic offshore islands Warbah and Bubiyan;
-Bahrain and Qatar over the Hawar Islands in the Bay of Salwa and over
the village of Zubarah on the west coast of the Qatar Peninsula;
-Ra's al-Khaimah and Iran over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs islands,
which the Shah of Iran seized by force in 1971;
-Sharjah, 'Ajman, Umm al-'Qawain, and Iran over offshore waters near Abu
Musa Island where petroleum was discovered in 1972;
-Sharjah and Iran over whose sovereignty should extend to the
geopolitically strategic Abu Musa Island located along the oil tanker
route in the Strait of Hormuz;
-Sharjah and Fujairah over their common borders, a dispute which
re-erupted in 1972 causing the deaths of some 30 Sharjan and Fujairan
tribesmen and which, in 1980, required the intermediating presence of a
battalion of the UAE Defense Force;
-Dubai and Sharjah over border territory desired for commercial
development;
-Ra's al-Khaimah and Sharjah over border territory thought to contain
lucrative deposits of phosphate; and
-Ra's al-Khaimah and Oman over land and offshore boundaries on the
Musandam Peninsula.
Equal weight should not be given to all of these disputes, but they do
reflect the diversity of interests among the Gulf countries. Despite the fact
that these disputes are outstanding, progress was achieved in several border
cases, especially in the Saudi-Bahraini and Qatari-Abu Dhabi maritime boundary
disputes. The settlements in these cases involved sharing the revenues of the
offshore oil sites. 6 3 On the other hand, the Abu Musa sovereignty problem
has remained a problem for 20 years. Periodic violence, such as the
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assassination of the Sharjan ruler in 1972, has highlighted the continuing
politico-legal disputes surrounding control of the island. Even an attempt to
settle this dispute has resulted in new differences. A plan to resolve the
dispute required Sharjah to pay Umm al-Qawain a percentage of the oil revenues
derived from the area, after total revenues had been first shared with
Iran. 64 Being second behind Iran has angered Umm al-Qawain, especially
given the declining production and oil profits from the disputed area. Thus,
economic, religious and nationalist differences compound the difficulties of
resolving these disputes.
Dynastic competition still marks contemporary inter-state relations in
the Gulf. There are twelve ruling families in the Gulf area which compete
politically; intra-family rivalries also effect political rule in various
states such as Saudi Arabia. Intradynastic rivalry and challenges have been
largely nonviolent in recent years, which has characterized much of the
political dynamic among the lower Gulf littoral states in the 1970s. 65
Exceptions can be cited in coups which resulted in the violent overthrow of
one ruler by another. Cases in point include a coup attempt by a ruling
family member in Sharjah in 1972, a similar but successful change of rulership
in Qatar in the same year, the 1970 palace coup of the Sultan Qa'bus deposing
his father. Of course, in 1975 King Faysal of Saudi Arabia was assassinated,
but by a vengeful, lone-acting member of the ruling family.
Interdynastic competition has often affected inter-state relations in the
Gulf. Central issues of dispute have included irredentist claims to
territory, secessionist claims to legitimacy of rule, or simple prestige
between heads of ruling families. 66 Relations between Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait reflect a dimension of regional competition for prestige and recognized
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leadership, based on different attitudes and interests, over issues such as
oil policy, foreign policy alignments and support for radical Arab groups.
Perhaps more important though is such competition among the smaller states,
Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, for example, which owe their independence
to dynastic struggles and which will certainly influence their ability to
agree on cooperation and integration in the areas of economics, energy and
defense.67 One example of the potential difficulties is the case of Qatar
and Bahrain. They are engaged in an on-going boundary dispute involving
offshore islands and a coastal village. The territorial claim is based on
what the ruling family of Bahrain used to control. One result of the dispute
is the different attitudes of Bahrain and Qatar on the value and form of
regional political integration, a difference owing to its previous history in
their territorial disputes.
Finally, there is the regional competition between radical and
conservative regimes. Here, of course, more attention is due to Iran, Iraq,
Oman, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, rather than the smaller shaykhdoms of the UAE.
Iraq had long belonged to the radical category, being the regional proponent
of secularism, socialism and friendliness to the USSR. Reintegration of Iraq
into mainstream Arab politics from 1978 foreshadowed a reversal of political
alignments.68 Conversely, Iran- perhaps the regional bastion of
conservativism- underwent a rapid transformation during its revolution. Now
it symbolizes fundamentalist Shia-style Islamic revolution, anti-monarchialism
and anti-imperialism (i.e., anti-American and anti-Soviet sentiment).
The destabilizing influence of foreign and politically radical
populations in conservative/moderate Arab countries has already been noted.
The generic solution attempted by these states is to gain a broad-based
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legitimacy by accomodating as many social and economic demands as possible,
without involving a change in the form of government. This approach
complements the increasing legalistic restrictions on the activities and
movements of foreign residents and ethnic minorities in each country in order
to inhibit their influence on the political preferences of the native
population.
How have differences between regional governments along "radical" and
"conservative" lines produced interstate conflict? In form, the result has
been to inspire dissident activity in neighboring countries with the purpose
of fomenting instability. In frequency, the events have been rather limited.
Iraqi proclivity to create troubles for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran during
Hussein's more radical days in the 1970s were largely constrained by the
prominent military power of the Shah. Indeed, it was Iranian support for
Kurdish insurgency within Iraq which preoccupied Iraq during much of the 1970s.
Iraq's opportunities for encouraging dissidence in Saudi Arabia have also
been constrained by the limited appeal of the secular, socialist Ba'athist
Iraqi regime to any particular political, social or economic element in Saudi
Arabia, especially given the Saudi's broad-based economic development
program. Those elements of domestic dissatisfaction which do exist in Saudi
Arabia are either relatively small or disorganized, or have religious
dimensions. In either case, Ba'athist influence is limited.
This history of political and ideological isolation of Iraq among Gulf
countries has limited its capacity to win friends in Gulf disputes, e.g., its
boundary dispute with Kuwait. Its favor among Gulf states changed only
following Camp David. However, that period saw a deradicalization of Iraqi
foreign policy preferences, apparently with less emphasis on its relationship
with the USSR.
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Other examples of the radical v. conservative competition exist for the
Arabian Peninsula. Here, the Yemeni civil war and the Dhufar rebellion are
representative. These conflicts are currently "settled," but their potential
for re-eruption certainly exists, especially given some outside, e.g., Soviet,
encouragement. Perhaps more germaine though is Iran. Iran presents the
region with a new form of "radicalism." It is anti-monarchial; it
intrinsically appeals to broad, though perhaps in the final analysis not
significant, sectors of the populations in neighboring countries. How that
can be understood in terms of a basis for anti-monarchial uprising is,
however, not clear. For example, Iraqi Shias have apparently not welcomed
Iranian invaders and turned on their own Ba'athist government.69
However, what the Gulf region's past and current level of radicalism has
achieved is to sensitize the conservative Gulf regimes to their common
interests in opposing the further spread of radicalism. Indeed, the
commonality of interests in view of the developments in Iran cut across
ideological lines creating the phenomenon of a socialist, secular Iraq in a
working alliance with Saudi Arabia.
Thus, three sets of interests emerge which may well be sufficient to
encourage the convergence of state policies, cooperation and integration in
the Gulf.70 First is the perpetuation of Gulf regimes. This interest is
closely shared among the monarchial states of the lower Gulf. However, it is
also an interest shared by Iraqi President Hussein who currently is relying on
Saudi and Kuwaiti political and financial support to remain in power. An
important component of the perpetuation of Gulf regimes is the common interest
in the prevention of radical movements from attaining influence of power.
This interest is clearly depicted in the discussion of the potential influence
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of diverse populations in Gulf states. Here, though, the term "radical" can
take on the broader, Iranian-inspired meaning which places Iraq in a similar
threat domain as the other lower Gulf countries.
Second is the uninterrupted flow of oil traffic. All states in the
region share the objective of maintaining access to outside markets. This
fact could encourage a degree of self-deterrence in interstate relations in
the area. As long as no state is "pushed to the wall " with its survival
threatened, or as long as every state perceives its own oil trade to be as
vulnerable as its adversary's, then massive threats to oil resources will not
necessarily characterize Gulf conflict. Yet the Iran-Iraq war presents a
sharp contrast in which a prime objective has been to damage the adversary's
oil industry in an effort to cripple its war efforts. The Iraqi attacks on
Iranian facilities which have occurred are closely correlated with a sense of
Iraqi desparation resulting from a significant reduction of its own oil
markets. The Iranian attacks on Iraq, conversely, are more suggestive of
Iran's confidence that it can prevail in a war of attrition, and that its own
oil industry is less vulnerable than that of Iraq.71  Oil industry
vulnerabilities to military action, however, raise the serious possibility
that attacks on oil facilities might in any situation become a form of
political signalling to adversaries or allies. This is a major aspect of the
Iranian-Iraqi oil attacks. The main threat, of course, is in uncontrolled
escalation. The contemporary question, related to this issue, is how the
Super Etendard fighters affect that calculus.
Third is the related interest in securing the highest possible or most
optimal exchange value for oil, measured in terms of economic and political
objectives. In this area there is more conflict especially as related to
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intra-OPEC politics in pricing mechanisms and oil production schedules.
To the extent that these general categories of interests are valid and
suggestive of motivations for state behavior, the question becomes one of
understanding the relations between Gulf states in light of their classes of
disputes and range of interests.
2.2.2 Gulf Relations
Saudi Arabia is the dominant actor in the lower Gulf. Thus it plays a
well-accepted, but not absolute, leadership role among the other lower Gulf
countries- Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE (the UAE consists of the
shiekdoms of Ra's al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Fujairah, 'Ajman, Umm al-Qawain, Dubai
and Abu Dhabi). Part of this role relates to Saudi Arabia's position as the
principal oil exporter in the Gulf. Part also relates to the similar
modernization problems and social stresses facing all of these conservative
monarchies. But beyond that, the Saudi's have taken an active lead in
attempting to resolve outstanding regional disputes in order to avoid being
caught between the conflicting parties. In a broader context, the Saudis seek
to reconcile region-wide disputes to enhance the prospects for regional
cooperation, especially the possibility of creating a Gulf-based security
regime. Saudi Arabia's role as a regional mediator had been evident from the
October 1973 War.
Immediately following the October 1973 War, the Saudi's sought and
achieved resolution of a long-standing territorial dispute with Abu Dhabi and
a continental shelf boundary problem with Kuwait. In addition, they mediated
in boundary disputes between Oman and the UAE and in the Qatari-Bahraini
sovereignty issue over the Hawar Island.72 What this level of activity
-33-
indicates is the Saudi calculation that the Gulf countries could not defend
against external aggression or alien ideologies from within, if outstanding
disputes fostered suspicions and precluded cooperation and policy coordination
of the Gulf states.7 3 Indeed, in a 1976 interview, Prince Fahd stated the
policy imperative of resolving these disputes to eliminate the region's major
irritants and impediments to cooperation. 74
As such the Saudis publicize a stated policy "to freeze the numerous Arab
disputes, then seek to dissolve them."79 The Saudi methodology is "to
attain bilateral reconciliation among various parties, or to confine disputes
to the narrowest possible scope. "80 This requires regional recognition of
its mediatory role and, fundamental to that, an open door policy with all
other Arab states. Thus, it works bilaterally with other states, through
existing regional organizations such as the Islamic Conference
Organization,81 or through new associations created out of an interest of
promoting stability and a framework of reconciliation, such as the Gulf
Cooperation Council. The Saudis view their diplomatic role of mediation
pragmatically, but describe it as a "traditional mission," "a living,
enlightening notion in the minds of Saudi leaders in the various phases of
their modern history."182 It is with this view of historical precedent that
Saudi officials promise to dedicate Saudi resources "to exert all its efforts
and put all its weight ... no matter what the price may be ... behind the
elimination of Arab disputes at this decisive stage of the (Arab) nation's
history. "83
Rhetoric such as this represents a "public relations" campaign to
demonstrate the legitimacy of a Saudi-led Gulf framework of stability.
Casting their role in this light amounts to a call for recognition of Saudi
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Arabia's unique capacity to fulfil this role. To this end, the Saudis stress
that "the kingdom is almost the only Arab country that can talk to everyone
and has kept the doors of dialogue open to everyone." 8 4 Such proclamations,
whether true or not, do not necessarily imply anything about the success of
Saudi attempts to persuade its neighbors. Saudi Arabia had been unable to win
Arab re-acceptance of Egypt in several instances following Camp David, for
example.
Implicit in Saudi efforts to reconcile disputes and forge an Arab
consensus of regional issues is the idea of moderating Arab state policies.
In pragmatic terms, this means supporting conservative, basically pro-Western
Gulf regimes and moving the more radical states like Iraq to policy positions
more compatible with Saudi interests. This is not to suggest, however, that
the Saudis would approve of any overt regional dependencies on, or a greater
regional role for, a Western nation, or that they will support only
pro-Western Arab states. 85
However, the dual approach of moderating foreign policies and maintaining
conservative domestic policies is well substantiated in the bilateral
relations between Saudi Arabia and other regional states. The internal social
situations of the Arab Gulf countries has already been discussed. These
internal schisms contributed to the beginnings of internal security-related
cooperation between the Saudis and other states. In 1976, the Saudis
concluded cooperative agreements with Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE. An
intelligence sharing agreement with Kuwait followed in 1979.
With the fragmentation of these societies, the Saudis have discouraged
power sharing plans designed to broaden the constituency involved in
decisionmaking in other states. The role of Saudi Arabia in encouraging the
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dissolution of the Bahraini National Assembly in 1975 is now accepted,
supported by the immediate extension of Saudi financial assistance to Bahrain
following that event.86 In 1976, King Khalid expressed concern during his
visit to Kuwait about the political freedoms left to that country's parliament
and press. Five months later, the Kuwaiti National Assembly was dissolved and
two pro-Palestinian newspapers were suspended.87  This is not to imply,
however, that only Saudi pressure led to the dissolution of the Kuwaiti
parliament. A serious clasn If interests had developed between the opposition
in Kuwait and the government of the ruling family.88 Saudi Arabia had
encouraged this action to preclude any moves against Kuwait's ruling family.
A more extreme case of dissuading any regional government from moving too far
from Saudi interests is presented by the Saudi role in supporting royalist
forces in Omani Marxist uprisings and in the Yemini civil war.89
Saudi relations with Iraq have followed a different course. The Saudis
found that they could do little to induce changes in Iraq's foreign policies.
Iraq had a prosperous oil economy and a strong military capability in its own
right which permitted it to withstand the threat or enticement of Saudi
financial power. This recalls earlier comments about Iraq's lack of leverage
over Saudi policy. Thus, the current atmosphere of conciliation, cooperation
and convergence of interests is not due to pressures and changes induced by
one side on the other, but to changing conditions in Iraq's domestic power
structure and in the regional political situation.
Domestic political conditions in Iraq favored increased concern with
internal stability. Power struggles within the Ba'ath Party and between the
Ba'aths and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) convinced Hussein of the need to
settle a domestically turbulent situation. He also became convinced of the
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Soviet's role in the destabilizing activities of the ICP.90
Perhaps more important was the changing Iraqi assessment of its proper
role in the Arab world. The Camp David Accords undermined the leadership role
of Egypt. Iraqi succession to that role seemed natural given its demographics
and economic and military strength. 91 However, its political position in
the Arab world reflected its more radical ideology; its secularism and
pro-Soviet orientation stood out in contradistinction to that of the oil-rich,
but Islamic, conservative monarchies of the Gulf. Yet to reduce Iraq's
political isolation required a less revolutionary rhetoric. Thus, attacks on
the regional intrusion of the Soviet Union 92 and on the communist ideology
complemented Hussein's increasing appeal to pan-Arab symbolism and to carving
out a place for Iraq in the center of Arab political struggles.93 A
revealing example of the change in Iraqi rhetoric/policy was Hussein's
pronouncement in 1980 that, as a part of the Arab National Charter, no Arab
state should use force against any other Arab state in an attempt to resolve
conflict. This represents a clear departure from its more radical posture
less than a decade earlier.
By the end of the 1970s, with Egypt out of the Arab camp, the Shah's rule
crumbling, the radicalism of Libya and Syria growing and the Arab perception
of the closeness between Saudi Arabia and the US intreasing, Hussein chose to
cast Iraq in the role of defender of Arab interests. 94 The next step for
Iraq was to initiate rapprochements with other Arab states, including Jordan,
Morocco and the UAE. In addition, Iraq resolved regional issues which had put
it at odds with Saudi Arabia; e.g., discontinuing aid to Dhufar rebels in
Oman, reducing its ties with radical Palestinian groups and not joining the
radical Confrontation Front opposing Camp David. The Saudis mediated in the
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Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary dispute, concluded a border agreement with the Iraqis
and, subsequently, have contributed significantly to the Iraqi war effort
against Iran. 9 5
As an example of the effort involved in resolving these disputes,
consider the Iraqi-Kuwaiti offshore island conflict. 96 The problem centers
on the two Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and al-Warbah which lie between the
Iraqi port Umm Qasr and open Gulf waters. Iraqi territorial claim to the
islands (and all of Kuwait) originated in the 1930s. However, Iraqi
recognition of Kuwait in 1963 did not lessen its pressure for control of the
two islands. In 1969, this pressure led to the deployment of Iraqi troops on
the islands, allegedly to deter Iranian aggression. Iraqi attempts to expand
its control resulted in Kuwaiti military action to regain the islands. Only
Arab, especially Saudi, pressure induced Iraq to withdraw its troops.97
Despite the 1975 settlement with Iran over Shatt al-Arab (now, of course,
void), Iraq still insisted on its role in defending these islands and, by
implication, its continued military presence. Since 1977, both Kuwait and
Iraq have maintained a demilitarized area on either side of their common
border in order to reduce tensions. No final resolution of the issues
surrounding control and defense of the islands has been achieved. Thus, it is
uncertain how Iraq might react to future threats to its access to the Gulf by
virtue of a hostile Kuwait, or from another nation's military power.
The most significant current fact affecting Iraq's regional political
status is the war with Iran. The significance of the Iranian Revolution to
the Arab Gulf states has already been mentioned. Details concerning the war
are available in a number of sources. The duration and intensity of the war
has done much to change Iraq's relations with the other Arab Gulf states.
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A quick victory would have benefitted Iraq in two ways. The first would
have been its ascension to undisputed leader and military power in the Gulf.
In addition, Iraqi control over the oil-rich province of Khuzistan would have
given Iraq control over most of Iran's oil wealth, an advantage both in terms
of economic gain and future bargaining leverage over Iran. 98 Also, defeat
of Iran would constitute a defeat of the revolution, at least diminishing any
nascent revolutionary aspirations of Shia Gulf populations. Although the
level of support drummed up by Hussein in the capitals of the Arab Gulf states
is uncertain, 99 Arab support of Hussein during the war is unmistakeable.100
The war, however, has dragged on for more than three years. Iraq's
inability to win the war, or to bring Iran to the negotiating table, creates
possibilities for regional instability. One such threat is presented by the
effect which Iranian military victories might have on Shia popular uprisings
throughout the Gulf. At least, Tehran might be encouraged that it has the
strength and appeal to export its revolution, as in its role in the attempted
Bahraini coup. 101
As perceptions of Iranian strength or tenacity are reinforced, so is the
perception of Iraq's limited military power and inability to fill a regional
leadership role. 10 2  Indeed, Iraq's dependence on Gulf financial and
diplomatic backing lends more credence to the central role of Saudi Arabia in
regional politics. 10 3  Gulf aid to Iraq now amounts to about $6.5 billion
every six months. Kuwait itself has extended about $6 billion in interest
free loans to Iraq for the war, which is costing Iraq about $1 billion per
month.1 0 4 By 1982, the GCC countries had provided at least $25 billion in
aid to Iraq. For 1983, Iraq requested a $35 billion aid package from the
GCC.105
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This level of aid may be more difficult for the Gulf countries to provide
in coming years. Economic slowdowns in Gulf countries are requiring domestic
economic adjustments,106 which may affect foreign aid outlays, even for
Iraq. In addition, Kuwait is growing more reluctant to support a strong
pro-Iraqi line. Three Iranian fighter-bomber attacks on Kuwait have
heightened the sense of vulnerability in that country. The UAE enjoys a
long-standing trade relationship with Iran, which it does not want to
jeapordize by adopting anti-Iranian policies. 10 7
Contributing to the emergence of Saudi leadership are the war-induced
instabilities in the Hussein regime. The war has uncapped several political
and social conflicts in Iraq. Military alienation from civilian leadership
reflects unhappiness about Hussein and Ba'ath conduct of the war.108
Although both the military and civilian leaderships sought to topple the
Khomeini regime and check the Revolution, war as the best way to accomplish it
did not receive full support in either wing of leadership.109 Defeats,
setbacks and huge casualties certainly create tensions within the military
service about how best to run the war. The Iraqi capture of Khorramshahr,
with heavy loss of life, was delayed 24 days by only 2500-3000 Iranian
defenders.1 10 Especially criticized in the armed forces though was Iraq's
invasion of Iran along the full length of their common border. 111  The World
War I-like trench warfare began with inadequate manpower, utilizing only three
of twelve Iraqi divisions with limited, ineffective attacks on Iranian
airbases.112  Less than a year later, Hussein had committed eight full Iraqi
divisions to stalemate combat.113
Popular support for the war seems to be holding.114 However, given the
stresses that the war has placed on Iraqi society, future popular support must
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remain uncertain. Almost every family has been touched by the war, with-
according to one lower estimate- its 60,000 Iraqi dead, 100,000 wounded and
40,000 captured. 115 Higher estimates range between 175,000 and 500,000
killed in the war.116 Economic development programs and political
liberalization have been derailed. 1 17 Reduced government budgets complement
increasing proportions allocated to defense, slowing down the economy even
further.118  Kurds and other dissident groups have taken advantage of the
war- and the military personnel shortages inside Iraq- to renew their military
operations. 119
The impact of the war on Iran's stability can be read in two ways.
Iranian successes in the war, not the least of which was expelling the Iraqi
military from all of Iran in 1982, are balanced by more recent setbacks after
it took the war into Iraq. Khomeini's successes have contributed to his
stability in Tehran. 12 0 The war has served the purpose of uniting the
Iranian clergy around the goal of exporting the revolution, thereby closing
the ranks at home.121  With these successes, Khomeini escalated his demands
for peace to include $150 billion in reparations and Saddam's overthrow. 1 22
As late as this year, an Iranian Majlis representative still called for the
export of the Islamic Revolution to Iraq. 123
Signs of Iranian weakness, however, could imply threats to the regime's
stability. Some elements of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reportedly
favor overthrowing Khomeini, while others want to wait for Khomeini's death.
These reports, if true, suggest that political stability in Tehran is not yet
a reality. 1 24 Despite such reports, Gulf states clearly fear both an
Iranian victory and continued Iranian instability. A victory would strengthen
Iran and the resultant change of regime in Iraq could jeopardize Gulf state
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security, especially for Kuwait and Bahrain.125 Short of an Iranian
victory, some believe that Iran will remain unstable for as long as another
fifty years. This time would be marked by the ever present possibility of
violent changes in government favoring a more militant Islamic Shia government
or a military government led by "lower level officers of the Nasser or
Qaddhafi type."126
For Saudi Arabia, Iran represents a military threat in the Gulf. A war
of words characterizes current Iranian-Saudi relatiorns. Iran's accusations
indict Saudi Arabia for being the base of Western imperialism in the Middle
East. The purpose is to undermine the Saudi claim to the role of defender of
the faith and of nonalignment in the Arab world. It follows then that Saudi
military strength is "devoted to the suppression of the oppressed Moslem
masses of the Peninsula" and "Saudi financial strength has been used solely to
further the interests of the US and to undermine the influence of Islam." 12 7
Saudi Arabia similarly sees Iran as being the region's primary threat to
stability. In a concerted effort to turn Arab and Moslem opinion against
Khomeini (as opposed to the Shia Islamic movement), Iranian policies are
described as "fascist," "rascist," "aggressive," "seeking to achieve the
objective of securing 'Lebensraum,'" and posing a "cultural challenge to the
Arab nation no less dangerous than the challenge posed by Israel." The
Khomeini regime is "barbaric" and displays "intransigence" (as opposed to
Iraqi flexibility) in response to regional efforts to end the Gulf war.128
In seeking to preclude any identification between Khomeini and the role of
guarding Islam, Saudi papers run coordinated editorials claiming that Khomeini
falsely hides behind Islam to subvert the Arabs: "Halting Khomeini's
expansionist tendency and eradicating it completely has now become an urgent
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Arab and Islamic responsibility in view of the fact that the threats of the
Iranian regime's forces to Iraq are indeed a threat to all the Arab countries
... Khomeini's danger is hiding behind Islam."129 Furthermore, it is
Khomeini's war policies which serve the interests of foreign parties.
Criticizing Iran's insistence on impossible demands for ending the Gulf war,
Saudi papers claim that "ending the Iran-Iraq war is vital ... to the Gulf
region's security and stability as well as keeping it aloof of foreign
intervention by the big powers." 130
The perception of Iran as a regional threat was reinforced when an
Iranian backed terrorist group attempted to instigate a coup in Bahrain in
1981.131 Following the coup attempt, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain signed a
security pact under which the Saudis can extend to Bahrain "unqualified
assistance if she requests it." 1 32 This pact presented a broader message to
Iran, or any other agent of instability in the region. Saudi Interior
Minister Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz represented the pact as an indirect "warning
to Iran that Saudi Arabia, along with the other Gulf countries, is responsible
for quashing any attempt to shake the security and stability of the Arab Gulf
region." Supporting this security directive is the policy "that Saudi
security forces are ready to support the security forces in any Gulf country
and to go to that country immediately if asked." 1 33
In addition to asserting a central Saudi role in regional security,
Prince Nayef "stressed that he expected all Gulf states to join the
Saudi-Bahrain security accord as a result of their common conviction that
Ayatollah Khomeini's regime poses a genuine threat to their security." 134
Operationalizing this security pact included "close cooperation between the
Interior Ministries of the two countries and the extradition of criminals,"
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but also it stimulated calls for the "creation of a Gulf rapid deployment
force to counter possible subversion in the region." 1 3 5 Clearly, such a
pact represented an attempt to secure broader consensus on regional security
arrangements.
This is a highly visible role for Saudi forces to play in the region. It
reflects the Saudi attempt to create legitimacy both for a regional role for
its forces, but also more importantly for a regional political association
within whose framework regional interests can converge into a set of policies
compatible with Saudi values. Thus, one would expect a broad range of
economic, energy and defense issues to concern decisionmakers. This, in fact,
will be seen to be the case when the GCC is discussed.
This section has analyzed the regional environment in which Saudi Arabia
has attempted to develop a basis for regional security cooperation. The
linkages between internal security concerns and regional stability multiply
the dangers of any political conflict in the Gulf. Appeals to Arab
"nationalism" are tied to appeals to Arab Islamic heritage to create a
foundation for the legitimacy of a central Saudi role in organizing and
directing a Gulf security regime. The sense of urgency is intensified by the
Gulf war and has provided the Saudis with an opportunity to initiate the
development of a defense plan. In the next section, we will look at past
attempts to organize a regional security arrangement and compare those with
current activities in the GCC.
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3.0 Early Efforts to Integrate Gulf Security Policy
This paper has examined sources of regional instability and its influence
among Gulf states. Especially since the fall of the Shah, a regional search
for security has marked Gulf state relations and Saudi state behavior. Saudi
methods have included an appeal to Islamic sentiment, both as a means of
rallying support around Saudi interests and as a means of undermining Iranian
attempts to export their form of Islamic revolution. Old regional disputes
received more attention in recent years, reflecting efforts of several Gulf
states- most importantly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait- to resolve divisive issues.
Thus, the emphasis has been on consensus building in the Gulf and establishing
a legitimate basis for regional cooperation. This section will review the
proposals prior to 1981 for regional security cooperation.
In 1968 the United Kingdom announced its intention to withdraw all
military presence from the Persian Gulf within three years. This announcement
initiated a series of intra- and extraregional attempts to reorganize a Gulf
security regime with the basic purpose of assuring the stability of the local
governments and ultimately the availability of oil. Cooperation increased
somewhat with the resolution of some border disputes and the political strife
of the Dhufar rebellion in Oman, but success in coordinating regional policies
and force postures never materialized.
The first official attempt to initiate discussion on a defense alliance
of the Gulf littoral states occurred at a Gulf Foreign Ministers' Conference
in Oman in November 1976. Despite regional concerns with this issue dating
back to the British announcement to withdraw, there was no basis for its
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discussion until the resolution of key regional disputes. 136  Notably, Iran
and Iraq had in 1975 settled their border disputes with the Shatt-al-'Arab
line being redrawn in Iran's favor and Iran terminating its military and
political support for the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. In addition, the end of
the Dhufar rebellion and the evacuation of foreign military presence served to
defuse regional tensions to the point of being able to discuss regional
defense needs.
At the Gulf Foreign Minister's Conference, five regional defense working
papers were examined. Submitted by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE,
these papers demonstrated varied positions as to the best form of coordinated
defense planning.137 Iran proposed a comprehensive mutual defense
alliance. On the other hand, the UAE, voicing Arab concerns about the
regional use of Iranian military forces and fears of the Shah's expansionary
interests, rejected the need for such a collective security program. Other
proposals addressed elements between these extremes, e.g., intelligence
sharing and non-aggression pacts.
The inability of the Gulf states to reach agreement on defense issues
reflected the residual undercurrents of regional conflict left unaddressed by
the Iran-Iraq agreement and the termination of the Dhufar rebellion. In
particular, not only had the Arab Gulf states not lost their suspicions of the
Shah's intentions, but also conflicts between Ba'athist Iraq and Kuwait, Oman
and Saudi Arabia, as well as between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, precluded
serious consideration of any military coordination. The smaller, weaker Gulf
states simply feared the institutionalization of their conflicts with their
larger, stronger neighbors if any pact were approved.
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Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example, developed along two
contradictory lines. On the one hand, their relationship during 1976-77 was
marked by rivalry and mutual suspicion, reflected by their sizeable arms
acquisitions and competing oil policies.138 At the same time, their mutual
fear of leftist influence and political upheaval led to a tacit understanding
of their spheres of influence: Iran in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia on the
Peninsula. 1 39 This relationship remained stable, even as efforts in 1977 to
coordinate Gulf surveillance over oil transportation yielded no results. 140
At this time, however, Saudi efforts to intensify security cooperation among
the lower Gulf states were weakened by its 1977 oil policy disputes with
Kuwait, which led ultimately to Saudi occupation of two Kuwaiti Islands in the
Partitioned Zone. Cooperation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia also remained
unattainable with the inherent suspicions between Iraqi socialist Ba'athism
and the conservative Saudi monarchy.
Cooperation focusing on internal security matters was, however, possible
among the lower Gulf states. Concern was especially evident following an
assassination attempt on the Syrian Foreign Minister in 1977 by Palestinians
living in the UAE. Although the Syrian minister was not killed, the UAE
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs was. A demonstration reacting against
the slaying resulted in several deaths, again at the hands of armed
Palestinian residents. This action stimulated renewed fears in the Gulf
states of internal unrest and terrorism against oil targets. Bilateral
agreements between the Saudis and Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE addressed
such issues as intelligence sharing and police communications and
cooperation. Indeed, the forms of cooperation elicited in these bilateral
agreements serves as the basis for the current GCC defense framework.
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The overlap between regional security and policing functions soon became
apparent, however. Oman and Iran, for example, agreed in early 1978 to
conduct joint naval surveillance in the Strait of Hormuz to deter the
possibility of terrorist action against oil shipping. 1 41  In addition the
lower Gulf states also began cautiously to extend their discussions from
police to military matters. In 1977, a Bahraini general discussed the
importance of military cooperation in the Gulf.142 Furthermore, the UAE
defense minister cited the need for coordination in arms procurement and
military training with the overall goal of fielding a single Gulf army capable
of defending any of the littoral states. 14 3 Such statements were a reaction
to American hints that the US would use force to guarantee Western oil
supplies, apparently from Soviet advances in the region.
Such US statements reflected growing concern about potential
instabilities in the Gulf region. Civil unrest in Iran, instability in
Afghanistan, and growing Soviet influence and Cuban activism in Ethiopia and
possibly the PDRY further startled Gulf littoral states. Saudi concern over
these sources of instability led to its plan for a "security belt" to be
established in the Gulf to include Iran and Iraq. 144  In the spring of 1978,
the Saudi concept of a Gulf security arrangement was not so much a matter of
"neutralizing the area from foreign influence, but of ensuring that the
stability of local regimes was not threatened by subversion." 14 5  Even in
1978, the Saudis recognized- at least rhetorically- that cooperation was
needed not only in defense issues, but also in "economic, information and
other spheres."146 This approach is raised again in the context of the GCC,
the purpose of which is to establish a broadly recognized legitimacy for a
security regime.
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In mid 1978 and during the uncertainty surrounding the Islamic Revolution
in Iran, the Sultanate of Oman proposed a joint Gulf security plan to insure
the security of navigation in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. In addition,
this plan explicitly mentioned the work of Soviet-inspired subversive elements
in the region.147 During this time also, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia
supposedly reached agreement on an intelligence sharing network to protect oil
sites. The media reported that this agreement would initiate "a major shift
in the strategic balance of the oil producing area."148 Whether this
article referred to a military pact or a looser defense cooperation remains
unclear. 149 )Despite further reports that all Gulf littoral states and the
YAR sought to participate, Kuwait refused, citing the need for cooperation and
coordination, but not alliances. 150
In June 1978, Iran announced that it would end its efforts to form a
regional collective security pact, which had failed because of Iraqi and Saudi
opposition. Henceforth, Iran intended to concentrate only on improving
bilateral relations in the Gulf. Most Gulf states saw the Shah as, whatever
else, a stabilizing factor in the region whose fall could only ignite regional
threats. Thus Ayatollah Khomeini 's rise to power sharpened the feeling of
vulnerability in neighboring Gulf states. Khomeini's ideology of exporting
Shia fundamentalism and, concomitantly, inciting Iranian and Shia populations
in Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and to a lesser extent in Saudi Arabia complemented
his anti-US and anti-monarchial sentiments, posing to the Gulf states a range
of particular threats. 151
Local responses took the form of tightening internal security
regulations. Regulation of the mobility and working rights of Iranians
throughout the lower Gulf and arrests of Shia demonstrators and clerics in
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Bahrain and Kuwait demonstrated the fear of Gulf governments over the threat
of internal subversion from Shia populations. 1 52
The case of Bahrain is illustrative. A few months after Ayatollah
Khomeini took power in Iran, a spokesman for that regime, Ayatollah Ruhani
reaffirmed Iran's historic claim to Bahrain, saying it was Iran's fourteenth
province.153 Despite an official denial several days later, claiming that
Iranian policy toward Bahrain had not changed, Bahraini leaders felt their
independence to be at stake. Bahraini Shias, allegedly in contact with
Ruhani, subsequently called for the establishment of a Khomeini-like Islamic
state in Bahrain. Shia demonstrations led to arrests, which were answered by
Iranian threats to back open rebellion against Bahraini rulers. As if in
support of its threat, the Iranian navy began a six day exercise in the Gulf
near Bahrain. In response, Bahrain requested and received reinforcement from
two Saudi army brigades. This action effectively neutralized whatever subtle,
but threatening, political signal which Iran intended to communicate.
Concern over such internal developments in the Gulf stimulated the search
for defense cooperation. From the Saudi viewpoint, concern focused on the
fear of insurrection, whether inspired by Iran or other outside powers seeking
to exploit local instabilities. Soviet inroads- from Afghanistan and the PDRY
to Iraq- presented particular difficulties. Unilateral US statements spoke of
the creation of a rapid deployment force whose mission would be to guarantee
Western access to Gulf oil by forcible occupation of the fields if necessary.
Official Gulf reaction, except for Oman, denounced these US statements and
warned against superpower confrontation in their region. 154 Aside from the
(inherent) vagaries of declaratory policy, however, the Gulf states linked
talk of US military action with Lloyds of London 1979 declaration of the Gulf
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as a war zone, which increased insurance costs to oil tankers and established
a precedent for escalating the costs of business in the Gulf. 155 The search
for security cooperation thus took on the dimension of re-establishing
business confidence in the area, a task which the Gulf countries reasoned
required broader forms of cooperation to encourage perceptions of security and
business stability in the Gulf.
The search for regional security followed attempts of Gulf countries to
resolve indigenous disputes to clear the way for enhanced cooperation. In
December 1978 during the upheavals in Iran just prior to the Shah's departure
and during Syrian-Iraqi discussions of a possible merger, Kuwaiti Prime
Minister Shaykh Sa'd undertook tours to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE
and Oman to explore the possibility of Gulf unification along the lines of the
EEC. Specifically, Sa'd sought broad cooperation in political, economic.,
cultural and information policy.156 During this time also, Kuwait
interceded in regional disputes between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, Oman and the
PDRY, YAR and the PDRY, and Iran and Iraq. Omani Ruler Sultan Qabus more
frequently consulted with Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the Dhufar problems
after the Iranian withdrawal from Oman in 1979. Qatar and Bahrain also
publically addressed the need for Gulf defense cooperation. 157
In early 1979, the Saudis began a diplomatic initiative to win consensus
for the basis of a Gulf defense treaty. Promoting "full cooperation among all
Gulf countries" as a precondition for creating a "region of peace, security
and stability," Saudi accomplishments fell short of any formal agreement.
Following Saudi military maneuvers that summer, King Khalid asserted his
readiness "to use all human, material and military resources in support of any
Gulf state facing an outside threat against its sovereignty and
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independence.n158 This marked a distinct shift, although not a new theme,
in the emphasis on Gulf security needs. Interestingly, the point complemented
a joint Gulf statement that US security guarantees went only as far as US
interests, i.e., access to oil and prevention of Soviet invasions. Thus, the
Gulf leaders enunciated their understanding that the US could not be counted
on to safeguard any particular regime in the Gulf. The precedent, after all,
had been Iran. 159
The real utility of the Saudi maneuvers and proclamation was realized in
Saudi awareness of the need to stabilize an uncertain security situation.
Whether or not Saudi Arabia had the necessary military strength to fulfill the
role seemed less important than its assertion, in essence, that it and the
other Gulf countries intended to protect their own security interests.
Despite closer rhetorical positions on defense coordination, an attempt
by the UAE to convene a Gulf security summit in July 1979 failed. The reasons
were both historical and contemporary, displaying the fragility of cooperation
on such a sensitive issue as defense policy. The failure reflected "mutual
suspicions deeply rooted in regional history; [the persistence of] traditional
local disputes, some of longstanding [sic]; disagreement over the nature of
the defense pacts or regional union; and conflicting economic interests due to
the inequitable distribution of wealth among the states and divergences in
their national economic systems." 160 It is clear, of course, that such
problems would still persist even after the establishment of the GCC.
However, despite the problems in organizing a defense agreement, attempts
to do so continued. An Omani proposal in September 1979 to include US
participation and financing in a Gulf defense plan won no overt support
because the other Gulf states adhered to a policy of rejecting foreign
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alliances. Yet, Bahrain's follow-up proposal to create a Gulf joint naval
task force also drew no responses from the Gulf states. 161  Later that year
though, Baharain and Kuwait signed bilateral military agreements, accompanying
Bahrain's announcement that its armed forces constituted an extension of
Kuwait's.162
3.1 The Gulf Cooperation Council
Established in the spring of 1981, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
constituted a regional response to growing concerns over political and
economic stability and military security in the Persian Gulf. Shaken
confidence of the international business community in the security of their
investments in regional economic development projects resulted from the
initial shocks of the Iran-Iraq war, especially with the realization that
economic targets were considered legitimate targets. In this sense, the
creation of the GCC is intended, at least in the perception of extra-regional
countries, to sustain "confidence in the continuation of stable business in
the area." 1 6
3
Defense coordination clearly was an important agenda item when the GCC
was formed. Yet, from its inception the six member countries, Bahrain,
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, could reach no agreement on a
military alliance or even a political confederation. Instead, the GCC more
closely resembles the EEC, based on the principle of economic cooperation and
gradual political integration. 164 From the beginning, however, several
proposals have outlined possible security arrangements. Oman called for a
joint naval force to patrol the Strait of Hormuz. Oman's geographical
position is strategically the most important and vulnerable. Thus, Sultan
-53-
Qabus favored a close linkage of a Gulf security regime to the US. Other
states favored a purely indigenous scheme. The Saudis suggested that the six
countries pool their military resources. Yet they opted for cooperation at
the security forces level falling short of the formality of an integrated
military pact involving the regular armies. 165 Kuwait expressed interest in
a joint command military structure. Bahrain resurrected the idea of a Gulf
weapons industry. None of these ideas have been acted upon; probably only the
Omani proposal has received any sustained attention.
At the first official GCC meeting in May 1981 the six states issued a
communique rejecting foreign intervention in the Gulf, as well as the presence
of foreign bases and navies. Despite such public proclamations, Oman provides
facilities, but no home port for the US Navy; Bahrain provides refueling
facilities; and Saudi Arabia welcomes the US presence in the Gulf, as long as
no land bases are involved.166 A clear divergence emerged on the issue of
identifying the threats to the Gulf. For Oman, Soviet encirclement of the
Gulf presents the greatest danger. For Kuwait, the most danger is posed by
the Iran-Iraq war, internal subversion and Gulf state alignment with the West,
which alienates the Soviets.
This section will discuss both the political and economic aspects of GCC
cooperation. The emphasis will be on what the overall goals are rather than a
detailed assessment of the feasibility and significance of economic
objectives. Then the focus will shift to defense strategies and interests.
In particular, an assessment of the GCC's balance between economic and defense
related priorities will be suggestive of the deeper motivation for the GCC
structure as presented here: establishing the legitimacy of Gulf force
deployments and management.
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3.1.1 Institutional Comments
The GCC was formed in February 1981 at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers
of the six countries in Riyadh. Bureaucratically, GCC meetings are at the
level of summit or foreign ministers meetings. It consists of three
institutions. At the top, there is a council of heads of state which meets
biannually. The next level is the council of ministers which meets four times
a year. This group is responsible for policy planning in all issue areas,
including security and defense. Finally, administrative tasks are handled by
a permanent secretariat based in Riyadh. The structure of the Council implies
a serious interest in the objective of policy coordination. A GCC
constitution, initialled in March 1981, governs the political relations in the
Council and delegates authority. However, that part of the constitution which
is part of the public domain rhetorically emphasizes the achievement of Arab
unity and the rejection of foreign influence. In addition, GCC
secretary-general Abdullah Yacoub Bishara said in the Saudi daily Al-Medina
that the GCC constitution rejects foreign military bases in the region and
stipulates the Council 's non-aligned status. 16 7
3.1.2 GCC: Economic Cooperation
In 1982 the GCC countries together accounted for 70 per cent of all
contracting work in the Middle East, 40 per cent of regional imports and 97
per cent of the surplus capital. 16 8 These countries are making efforts to
coordinate economic reforms and energy policy. In March 1983 several measures
were introduced as first steps toward integrating the individual economies.
These included: an elimination of tariffs on certain goods traded between GCC
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countries; easing capitial investment restrictions within the GCC; promotion
of professional mobility within the GCC; and creation of a Gulf Investment
Corporation with broad powers to invest in development projects.169
Although it is suggested that the tariff reforms in particular will not, for
various reasons,170 have an immediate impact on local economies, what is
important is the creation of the framework in which to pool the individual
markets. The advantage then is that the GCC members are "making a big step
towards overcoming one of the biggest hurdles to development: being unable to
tap the economies of scale of capital-intensive industries."171
Lifting barriers to the creation of a larger Gulf market is leading to
consideration of a common industrial policy in the GCC to avoid duplication of
development programs in individual countries. Although a number of problems
need to be solved, a draft of a coordinated industrial policy is discussed for
late 1983.172 In particular, it is suggested that to develop such a policy
would require mechanisms for one government to subsidize, at some level.,
another's development project. Another requirement would be to unify external
tariffs while needing both to protect young indigenous industries and yet to
stimulate trade, creating export markets and meeting broad import demands. 173
A second area of cooperation within the GCC is on energy policy.
Although joint action and policy formulation is in its initial stages, key
areas of energy policy have been identified. A broad pledge "to unify their
positions in OPEC and OAPEC" have led to discussions of crude oil and gas
pricing, coordinating oil production output schedules, and encouraging the
development of the member states' energy industries, e.g., GCC priority for
further investment in Oman's and Bahrain's oil industry.174
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3.1.3 GCC: Defense Cooperation
Following the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the
United States sought to establish the Shah of Iran as the guardian of regional
stability. In fact, the Shah did advocate a collective security pact in the
Gulf which would include Iraq and Saudi Arabia, but which would be
unambiguously led by Iran. After the initial phases of the Islamic
Revolution, Saddam Hussein of Iraq sought the leadership role. Hussein called
for the creation of a collective Arab Gulf Security Force. As a supplement to
the Arab League Joint Defense Pact, it would draw its manpower from the
individual armies of the Gulf states. Although its status was to be
autonomous, the fact that it was to be a primarily military organization
preselected the leadership role for Iraq. Saudi Arabia resisted collective
security agreements which would place Iraq in the lead. Finally the Iran-Iraq
war broke out, partially the result of Hussein's eagerness to become the
recognized leader of the *Arab world. In Hussein's view, Iraq would step into
Egypt's traditional role, whose support in the Arab world had been weakened by
the Camp David accords, by defeating an apparently weakened and
revolution-torn Iran. That war is still being waged with heavy casualties,
huge economic losses and relatively stable battle lines. In this environment,
with the two dominant Gulf military powers distracted, Saudi Arabia organized
the GCC to address regional defense issues.
The main impetus behind the formation of the GCC was the interest in
forming a defensive strategy for the Gulf countries. 1 75 For GCC ministers,
an independent Gulf defense strategy should have three elements. 17 6 First,
the strategy should maintain nonalignment. Some of the differences between
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Gulf countries on this point have been mentioned. The GCC declaratory policy
is adamant on this issue. Yet the second element runs counter, in practice,
to this first goal. The second element is the establishment of a Gulf
military base capable of protecting national security in the Gulf. This
involves a build-up of local military forces with the latest and most
sophisticated of weapons. The purpose of such a military capability is not,
however, to wage sustained combat. Security in the Gulf, in the Saudi view,
depends closely on the maintenance of a global balance of power in which an
invasion by either the east or west will be deterred by the other. Rather
this military power would provide options for deterring and meeting threats
within the region in a manner designed to re-establish the local balance of
power in the event of the outbreak of violence. Finally, promoting internal
security within each country and containing regional disputes is the third
most important element of a Gulf strategy. In this case, cooperation in
internal security matters and mediating an end to the Gulf War are important.
The latter element has proved to be the most consistent and visible aspect of
GCC defense cooperation.
The framework of the GCC security agreement is based on bilateral
security agreements between Saudi Arabia and Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the
UAE. These agreements were signed bilaterally to provide near term linkages
among the GCC member countries and to create a precedent for broader Gulf
consensus on a GCC-wide security agreement.177  In 1980 Saudi Interior
Minister Prince Nayef Ibn Abdel-Aziz traveled to the other Gulf states to
promote a regional collective security plan. The Saudi plan established five
principles of Gulf security which provide a clear basis for a GCC defense
pact. 178
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First: Collective Arab security depends on continued security and
stability of each individual Arab state. If the security of one or
more states is jeopardized, then the collective security of all is
threatened.
Second: Maintaining the collective security requires Arab states to
respond with assistance at the request of any Arab state whose
security is threatened. Such assistance would, in particular, help in
combatting "local and imported sabotage, and cooperating at the
international level to stop international criminals from entering the
Arab states."
Third: A mechanism of collective security requires closer cooperation
among the regional Arab police forces. This includes coordination of
activities, exchange of information and rapid communications.
Fourth: Saudi Arabia, in view of principle one, "urges cooperation to
establish collective Arab security and deny any international
criminals and saboteurs access to the Arab society or refuge in Arab
countries."
Fifth: Saudi Arabia is ready to cooperate with other Arab states "in
any way" and "at all levels" to maintain security and stability in
every Arab state.
These principles of collective security refer to local and regional
threat categories. Much of the local threat, such as sedition, shaken
confidence of the people in the leaders, or students and workers spreading
chaos, is attributed to "imported" ideologies, the work of spies, or the
infiltration of Arab countries. Hence, there is a clear emphasis on
cooperation among internal security forces. This level of cooperation,
according to this Saudi plan, is preferable to "an integrated military pact
that would require involvement by the regular armies."179
This restriction runs counter to some of the more recent literature
available on the progress of a GCC defense agreement. On the one hand, the
Saudi plan calls Gulf cooperation "strategically inevitable and urgently
required." On the other hand, it rejects the formation of "military alliances
and defense pacts between the countries of the region and foreign powers."
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But the Saudis apparent rejection of an indigenous Gulf military agreement,
supplanted at the time with their UN efforts to have the Gulf declared a "zone
of peace,"180 was a move to undercut Iraq's efforts to form such a pact and,
inevitably, to dominate Gulf security policy.
Several Gulf military maneuvers in the past two years have underscored
the possibilities for defense cooperation beyond merely internal security
issues. Individual countries have held their own maneuvers, including Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait and Oman. The first coordinated GCC military exercise was held
in October 1983 in the UAE. Codenamed Gezira Shield, these exercises were
intended to serve as a precursor to a GCC rapid deployment force. 181
Although it was supposed to have involved only ground forces, the exercise
included elements of the member states' ground and air forces. A proposal
being considered at the November 1983 GCC summit meeting in Qatar is to
allocate $6 billion for military equipment, manpower and training for joint
air, naval and ground units for a GCC rapid deployment force (RDF).182 This
RDF would be directed from a C31 network headquartered in Riyadh.
A second important area of defense cooperation in the GCC concerns air
defense coordination. The concept of a single air space for the Gulf region
is being studied by the GCC's general secretariat. 183  At a GCC defense
ministers meeting in October 1982, Saudi Arabia presented its study on a plan
to expand the current Saudi air defense network so that it covers all GCC air
space. Under this plan, Saudi AWACS would watch activities around the Red
Sea, the Horn of Africa, the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula and the
Gulf. As a first step, the Saudis proposed the coordination of anti-aircraft
systems.184
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The Saudi plan has been reportedly approved, by some sources, and
reportedly shelved, by other sources. One report suggested that
implementation awaited only the arrival of experts and technicians "from among
area citizens." 18 5 Probably a more credible analysis suggested that the
plan had been shelved. 18 6 The reason did not reflect any difficulty in
agreeing to the content of the plan. However, implementation of the plan
requires a massive commitment to accepting US arms sales, including
interceptors, missiles, radars and communications equipment. Hundreds more US
military personnel would be required to train Arab state personnel on the
systems. This relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US is well
documented. The difficulty, though, is the reluctance of other Gulf states,
notably Kuwait, to accept this scale of contact with the US. Indeed, this
problem may well derail any attempts to standardize Gulf military purchases as
well.
Currently, only bilateral agreements between Saudi Arabia and the other
Gulf Council countries are in force. However, a comprehensive security
agreement was reported to be "in the final stages of preparation" by Saudi
Interior Minister Prince Nayef Ibn Abdel-Aziz in April 1983.187 By July,
Kuwait had "finalized amendments" to the proposed pact, having blocked a
clause which would permit one country's security forces to pursue suspects 20
kilometers into the next country.188 Yet, in October Kuwait, probably owing
to its large immigrant population, still objected to "several clauses,
including those related to cross border disputes and extradition of
criminal s."189
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This discussion of the GCC outlined both agreements and disagreements
over internal security issues, as well as military aquisitions which
potentially signal broader defense plans for the region. Since the GCC has
existed for only three years, it is difficult to ascribe the lack of progress
to particular reasons. Whatever other outcomes are possible, the political
and economic cooperation serves a legitimizing function both as channels of
communication for the six rmmber states and a broader base of cooperation from
which to deal with outside states. If the GCC can avoid being labelled as a
defense alliance, it might avoid the liabilities which could be incurred both
in the Arab world and elsewhere.
More significantly, however, are the barriers to security agreements even
within the GCC framework. The problems of an implicit US role are illustrated
more clearly in the next section on arms acquisitions. But even within the
GCC political framework, disagreements over the extent of security cooperation
is indicative of deeper disputes. Unambiguous evidence is not available, but
the Saudi security plan combined with the military capabilities they are
acquiring implies the establishment of both the legitimacy and capacity to
intervene militarily in the internal affairs of neighboring countries facing
"1 subversive threats." This proposition is consistent with Kuwait's
intransigence over the criminal extradition and cross-border pursuit rights
sought under the Saudi plan.
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4.0 Defense Issues and Events of Relevant Countries
Different types of regional threats and tensions facing Gulf countries
have been examined. This section presents a comparative discussion of
regional defense policies and issues with an emphasis on examples of
cooperation and coordination. 1 90 These policies will be related to the
regional threats discussed in section two.
The six GCC member states are examples of developing countries which are
transforming their economic assets into military power. In this section, we
will examine two particular points: whether collectively these states have
sufficient military power to meet regional or extra-regional threats; and
whether collectively these states can redefine the Gulf security environment
in terms of their own interests.
The central argument underscoring this assessment of each country's
defense status is that the diffusion of power in the region, for which the
security regime could formerly be characterized as part of a bipolar global
arrangement, may set the necessary conditions for a new organization of
regional security interests. This claim is based on similar propostions for
the developing world in general. Specifically, the spread of military force
capabilities around the world has: (i) contributed to the international
security system becoming more diffuse and decentralized; and (ii) given the
developing countries "the capacity and will to utilize actively a range of
politico-military instruments for the extension of power and influence." 191
The absence of order and security in the Third World is demonstrated by
increasing numbers of internal conflicts, coups, civil wars and insurgency
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operations.192  We have seen that both internal and regional threats, and
the potential for spillover from one into the other, constitute fundamental
challenges to the survival of Gulf regimes. The growth in military
expenditures in the Third World, and especially in the Middle East,193 is
indicative that these states search for internal stability and "seek at least
to neutralize the advantages of militarily more powerful rivals."1 94  The
emphasis here is not necessarily on the ability of small regional powers to
wage sustained combat, but 4t least on the deterrent value of their military
forces. 1 95 The absence of a military capability could well invite limited
armed aggression designed to induce a political settlement of a bilateral
conflict. Indeed, in the absence of any military capability, the mere threat
of such aggression might be sufficient to induce a political settlement. An
example would be the Iranian air threat to Saudi oil facilities on the Gulf.
Destruction of a few key targets like pumping stations or gas-oil separators
could result in major production cuts and equipment losses which could take up
to two years to replace.196 Without a Saudi air defense system,
revolutionary Iran might have been tempted to execute such an airstrike,
perceiving little resultant political cost.
The development of Saudi military doctrine, concentrating on land-air
coordination, mobility of forces and effective command, control and
communications (C3), places the emphasis of the Saudi military buildup on
weapons technology and battlefield management. The objective is clearly to
deter regional aggression. The result, however, may exceed the objective. The
military forces of developing states can also deter military action by the
superpowers. In addition, by checking the possibility of spillover between
internal and regional crises, Arab Gulf military power can remove at least
-64-
some of the incentives and justifications for superpower intervention in
regional conflict. The conclusion of this section will be suggestive of this
outcome. In this way, Saudi Arabia hopes to use the GCC to transform the
relationship between regional security arrangements and the international
security system. 197
Table 2 summarizes current demographical, economic and military
indicators for the GCC countries. Of particular interest are both the
relatively small sizes of the armies and recent economic trends. Trends of
military growth and arms transfers will be discussed for each country.
However, it is currently uncertain what impact, if any, reduced GDP growth
will have on future defense spending in the Gulf.
4.1 Bahrain
Bahrain has had a pro-US and pro-Saudi orientation since its independence
in 1971. In the military area, it has cooperated with both of these
countries, as well as Kuwait and Jordan. Bahrain supports the development of
regional defense institutions which, while not to rely on explicit American
guarantees, do not adopt an anti-Western orientation.
In late 1977, Bahrain extended the use of an airbase to Saudi Arabia, the
Saudis first extraterritorial military installation. This base has been
characterized as "a natural extension of the Saudi air defense system, as well
as a contribution to the collective security of the Arab Gulf and to the
defense of Bahrain." 198
Also in that year, Bahrain terminated an agreement with the US which
permitted a US Navy three-ship fleet basing rights at the Jufair air and naval
base. The navy ships were still permitted to visit Jufair under a new
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agreement. So, while the Navy basically enjoyed the same privileges, the
removal of the basing rights served Bahraini domestic political objectives of
heading off potential unrest focused on the presence of a US base.199  The
following year, with some financial inducement from Saudi Arabia and in
reaction to the Marxist coup in Afghanistan and Soviet activity in the PDRY
and the Horn of Africa, Bahrain re-leased basing rights to the US Navy,
apparently causing no negative regional reactions.200  After the fall of the
Shah, there is some evidence that the US moved its intelligence installations
to Bahrain from Iran.201
As Bahrain developed its armed forces, cooperation with Kuwait and Jordan
in the areas of military training and intelligence sharing intensified. The
government established a Supreme Defense Council in late 1978 apparently to
coordinate Bahrain's military development with its economic capabilities and
political policies. 202 The Council includes the Prime Minister, Minister of
Defense, Foreign Minister, Minister of Interior, Minister of Finance and
Economy, the military Chief-of-Staff and the Intelligence Chief.
In 1982 the Bahraini Defense Forces decided to procure an air defense
capability. Currently, it is based on only four US F-5E Tiger II fighters,
two F-5F trainers, and US and Swedish surface-to-air missile systems. 203
4.2 Kuwait
Regional threats seem to have stimulated the recent development of
Kuwaiti armed forces. Kuwait's defense modernization program has received
attention for some time, but was intensified in response to territorial
seizures in Kuwait by both Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1976-77. In 1976
following the incursion of Iraqi troops into Kuwait to reinforce annexation
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demands, a seven year Defense Development Plan took effect at a projected cost
of $3 billion. This plan provided for compulsory military service, military
construction including a naval base and training schools, and arms
purchases.204 Kuwait's draft, the first in the lower Gulf states, began in
1979.
Two aspects of Kuwait's military program are worth special mention: its
emphasis on naval development and the policy of diversification of arms
sources. Both the Iraqi and Saudi military actions against Kuwait involved
the seizure of islands. Interest in naval development led to 1977 contract
agreements for Japan, Yugoslavia and Pakistan to assist in the construction of
a naval base. At that time, Kuwait had only 28 lightly armed patrol boats and
launches. As part of the Defense Development Plan, negotiations immediately
began to purchase more advanced guided missile and fast attack craft from
European, especially British, sources.
At the onset of the 1976 defense plan, Kuwait decided to pursue a policy
of diversified arms sources in order both to preclude the possibility of being
subject to political pressures and to develop a broad market. With a greater
number of suppliers, Kuwait could acquire the "best" mix of weapons and,
perhaps more importantly, might avoid being viewed as a dependent client of
the West. Kuwait purchased fighter-bombers, anti-aircraft batteries,
air-to-air missiles, artillery, tanks and guided missile craft from the UK,
France and the US. Kuwaiti nervousness owing to fighting between Iran and
Iraq, especially in view of the three Iranian air strikes on Kuwait, recently
led to new orders of French weapons.205 The French state firm SNIAS will
soon ship six Exocet-equipped Super Puma helicopters, often used in anti-ship
roles by other nations. Twelve Dassault-Breguet Mirage F-lC fighters also
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will be delivered soon. In addition to these orders, a broader military
cooperation agreement has been signed which provides for the training of
Kuwaiti pilots in support of an air defense/anti-aircraft program.
Kuwaiti interest in purchasing Soviet military equipment caused the most
regional consternation, however. What began as a broad, $400 million purchase
order in 1976 from the Soviets shrunk to an order for only the SAM-7 missile.
The issue at stake was the Soviet insistence that Kuwaiti military personnel
receive their training on the Soviet systems from Soviet advisers either in
Kuwait or the USSR. Kuwait, however, would accept training only from
qualified Egyptian experts. The impasse reflected both Kuwaiti and Saudi
concerns over the presence of Soviet military advisers in the Gulf
0 206
region. Kuwait's concern centered on the advisers as sources of Marxist
indoctrination of Kuwaiti military personnel. The Saudis would surely be
concerned about that also, especially given their general policy goals of
minimizing the Soviet presence on the Arabian Peninsula. SAM-6 and SAM-7
missiles eventually entered the Kuwaiti force structure, but with the
insistence of Kuwaiti officials that the Soviets were not involved in the
training.207
Nevertheless, Kuwait s arms procurement policy still requires
diversification of sources and includes the US, UK, USSR and France. Perhaps
owing to its compulsory military service laws, all Kuwaiti weapons are
serviced by "teams of specialists made up of Kuwaitis."208 Maintaining this
sort of independence from any foreign influence is part of the overall
objective, which is according to Kuwaiti Defense Minister Sheik Salem
al-Sabbah al-Salem, "to transform our army into a force capable of defending
the national soil and supporting the Arab armies, to help them recover the
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despoiled territories." 209  A note, which will resurface later in the Saudi
section and in discussing regional cooperation, is the reluctance to identify
any threat, except the most obvious one and the one likely to engender the
least regional reaction- Israel.210
An interesting example of Kuwait's intentions for military development
can be seen from recent multi-force or combined arms exercises.211 The
exercise involved the Kuwaiti Sixth Motorized Infantry Brigade defending
against a sea assault. This particular mission does not represent the full
operational development of the Kuwaiti army. Apparently, the Sixth Brigade's
assignment is to prepare for this contingency. Missions of the army in
general include defending against "Israel's threats to occupy the Gulf and
destroy its oil wells" and "any other threats emanating from any
quarter." 212 Sensitivity of the military leadership to political objectives
and directives is supposed to maintain the military's loyalties in countering
and deterring the threats perceived by the government. This is an important
point, if true, given the heterogeneous character of the Kuwaiti military
leadership, including foreign nationals.
The exercise displayed two interesting developments. The first is the
pattern of defense employed. The second is the combined arms nature of the
training. Defense against sea assault, for example, involves a "holding"
strategy, winning time for the main counterattack forces to be concentrated.
The defense apparently began as a blocking operation which permitted the enemy
forces to establish a beachhead. That advanced defense unit then retreats,
"enticing enemy forces" (apparently to advance, unaware of a strong
counteroffensive force poised to strike). It is then that a combined arms,
concentrated force of shock troops coordinates "in a stragetic move to stop
-70-
the penetration, using maximum force and weapons." The forces involved in
such defense include infantry supported by tanks and Gazelle helicopters,
apparently in an anti-tank configuration. Skyhawk fighter-ground attack
aircraft engage the enemy as soon as the infantry does, apparently while the
beachhead is being established. Artillery fire supports the withdrawal of the
initial defense force to prevent an enemy breakout prior to the Kuwaiti
counterattack.
Although no time scale for the holding strategy was discussed (the
exercise, however, lasted one day), the emphasis on containing the enemy
advance with one particular unit would be most useful in a situation requiring
mobilization time, time to assemble a counterattacking force, or time to
permit outside assistance to be readied.
This assessment apparently emphasizes a deterrent-by-denial function
against foreign invasion. By denying an adversary the opportunity for a quick
victory, an attack is deterred. Another way to look at it is that the Kuwaiti
army serves a primarily tripwire function. 213 This view holds that periodic
(especially by Iraq) invasions and military occupation of Kuwaiti territory
has given the Kuwaiti army the mission of fighting an invasion "with
sufficient vigor to enable Kuwaiti diplomacy to mobilize support in other Arab
countries." 214  The nuance here is that the Kuwaiti force structure is not
intended to be capable of fully repelling invasions or waging sustained
combat. On the contrary, the mission is intended to support Kuwaiti diplomacy
in the event of hostilities and to prevent rapid occupation of Kuwaiti
territory.
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4. 3 Oman
In recent years Oman has faced two sets of security problems, one related
to the Dhufar rebellion and the other to the Strait of Hormuz. Oman, with the
assistance of Iranian forces provided by the Shah, quieted the rebellion of
the Marxist oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, supported by
the PDRY in early 1977. The mediation of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait led to the
removal of most of the Iranian forces after most of the combat had stopped,
but no lasting reconciliation occurred.215 The remaining Iranian force
demonstrated the Shah's interest in regional security cooperation; the force
assisted in the development of Oman's air defense system based on the British
Rapier missile. 216 The last Iranians left Oman during the revolution in
Iran.
Initially in concert with Iran and then because of Iranian withdrawal
during the revolution, Oman initiated a naval build-up to protect its long
coastline and to patrol the Strait of Hormuz. The international trade routes
going through the Strait are entirely within Omani territorial waters since
that is the only part of the Strait where the water is deep enough for the
tankers to transit. Since the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, transport ships
have been- stopped or seized in the Strait, including 14 UAE ships seized by
Iran. 217  In 1979 Oman reinforced its military strength on the Ra's Musandam
Peninsula overlooking the Strait.218 At this time also, Oman first granted
port facilities to the US Seventh Fleet.219 By 1983, Oman approved a $300
million project to build a naval base at Wadam Alwi on the Batinah coast.
Oman's small, yet expanding navy is largely under the command of British
officers.220 Fast attack craft with Exocet SSM are deployed at Oman's naval
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bases at Muscat, Raysat and Gharam Island. The Omani navy is currently the
most experienced and effective in the GCC, 221 yet still "is a light patrol
force that can barely cover Oman's long coastline against terrorist
infiltration or arms smuggling and which has limited ability to deal with more
serious threats." 2 22 However, the Omani patrol boats did confront three
Iranian frigates approaching the Strait in Omani waters in September
1980.223 Omani naval presence has apparently deterred any further Iranian
attempts to approach the Strait in force.
In September, the GCC countries agreed to grant $1.8 billion for regional
defense spending, in part to improve Omani defensive capabilities in the
Strait of Hormuz and to purchase advanced fighters from the US.224 This
decision apparently is in addition to Oman's purchase of a second squadron of
12 Jaguar International fighter-bombers, adding to the 19 already
operational .225 The purchase of 250 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and 28
Blindfire radars to complement existing Rapier air defense missile systems
will provide a limited air defense system by the mid 1980s.
Currently, the Omani air force is designed mainly for ground attack
missions and has a counterinsurgency squadron. Although the air force is
considered to be weak when facing an opponent like Iran, it has "considerable
capability to deal with internal security threats" and also a growing air
threat from South Yemen. 226
British training of the ground forces has led to a special competency in
fighting guerrilla and light infantry forces. 227 The 15,000 strong Omani
army is itself basically a light infantry force. The Sultan has plans to
equip his army with heavy armor, artillery, long-range anti-tank weapons and
helicopters. However, shortages of educationed and technical manpower to
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operate such weapon systems will limit the army's expansion. 228
Oman faces military threats to the north from Iran and to the south from
the PDRY and, to a lesser extent, the Dhufar rebels. Soviet-backed PDRY army
units are only at 30-40% authorized strength, but tank squadrons near the
Omani border and the presence of Soviet and Cuban advisors suggest that the
current relatively minor threat posed to Oman could change in the near term,
especially if the PDRY saw benefit in attacking with limited objectives, e.g,
taking the Omani air base at Thumrait.229
Notwithstanding Kuwaiti and UAE protests over the informal US-Omani
alliance, Oman has continued to cooperate with the US to the extent of
exercising with elements of the RDF and prepositioning stock of US supplies to
support air operations.230 The US is improving Omani communications and air
bases.
4.4 Qatar
Qatar achieved its independence in 1971. No particular issues seem to
have dominated Qatar's military situation between its independence and the
beginnings of regional cooperation in the 1980s. Qatar began a modest
modernization program in 1977 with the purchase of French fighters, and medium
and long range US and British SAMs. Recent orders included 14 Mirage
fighters, six Alpha Jets and Exocet-equipped fast patrol boats.231 These
purchases indicate a interest in a coastal defense program and creation of an
air defense network. From the late 1970s, Qatar has supported the idea of an
Arab arms industry with the stated intention of freeing the Arabs from
dependence on foreign weapons producers. 232
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4.5 UAE
The United Arab Emirates is a federation of seven principalities: Abu
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ras al-Khaymah, Fujayrah, Ajman and Umm al-Qaywayn.
The federal army was created by incorporating the individual armies in 1976,
five years after the establishment of the UAE. 233 The UAE armed forces
included the British-trained Trucial Oman Scouts of 3500 men, the National
Guard of Sharjah of 250, the Motorized Force of Ras al-Khaymah of 300, the
Defense Army of Dubai of 1500 and the Defense Army of Abu Dhabi of
24,000.234 Because of the unequal contributions of the principalities to
the federal army, a Jordanian general was given operational command to
preclude any one state, especially Abu Dhabi, from taking control of the
army. 235 Three regional commands divided the new army: the western region
in Abu Dhabi, the central region in Dubai and the northern region in Ras
al -Khaymah. 236
Within a year, divisions in the federal army, reflecting the existence of
separate regional commands, were still apparent. An effort to reorganize and
to unify the armed forces, and to increase their mobility, precipitated a
crisis in 1978 which deepened the distrust and division in the UAE.237 The
Supreme Commander of the UAE force, President Shaykh Zayid of Abu Dhabi,
ordered a reorganization of the army which unified army and naval forces and
abolished the separate regional military commands. However, Shaykh Rashid of
Dubai, Vice President of the UAE, feared that such a move would consolidate
too much power under Zayid. Consequently, he put the Dubai army on alert and
cancelled Zayid's decree while the latter was abroad.
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No resolution of this crisis subsequently occurred. Although the
reorganization plan was cancelled, the UAE's arms procurement program and
manpower building program continued. 238 In a case similar to that of
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia discouraged the UAE's plans to purchase arms from the
Soviet Union, instead convincing the UAE to maintain its British and French
connections.239
Full integration of the UAE armed services has not yet occurred. Indeed,
the separate components of the military act independently in a number of
areas, including arms purchases.240 However, the size and sophistication of
the military continues to grow. From around 26,000 men in 1977, the force has
grown to 48,500 in 1983, of which 46,000 are ground troops. 241
The current practice in the UAE is to absorb modern technology and
military strategy in what President Zayid described as "a race against
time."242 UAE President Zayid recently inaugurated a new airbase and air
force college at Al Dhafra, their first such base.243 The base houses
French Mirage fighter-bomber/interceptors and Gazelle helicopters. Other
purchases include British Aerospace Hawk Mark 61 combat trainer strike
aircraft. Eight have been ordered by Dubai and Abu Dhabi is negotiating for
16-18.244 In addition, an order of 12-14 Harrier AV8B vertical takeoff
fighters is thought to be likely in the near future for the UAE, with the
total order possibly rising to 30-40 eventually. 245
The French and Americans are also interested in selling aircraft. French
Defense Minister Charles Hernu visited the UAE in May 1983 to discuss the sale
of 40 Avions Marcel Dassault/Breguet Aviation Mirage 2000 fighters. The US
Northrop Corporation is similarly interested in selling its new F-5G
Tigershark fighter, a special, relatively inexpensive Third World export
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version.246
Although the UAE now has around 52 combat fighters, including two
interceptor squadrons with 30 Mirage 5s, its interest in new aircraft reflects
the objective of doubling the air force strength and supplementing a
surface-to-air missile (SAM) being purchased from the US. This system
consists of seven Hawk SAM missile batteries purchased from the US Army at a
cost of over $600 million. This purchase is part of a larger effort of the
UAE to establish a command and control system to cover the entire UAE. The
UAE and the US plan to integrate the communications component of this system
with the airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft based in Saudi
Arabia. 247
4.6 Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia's military forces are undergoing a massive transformation
with infusions of the latest Western technologies. Changing
political-military conditions in the Gulf region have placed a greater
emphasis on the reliability of the Saudi military to protect Saudi interests.
An earlier security framework, which included US support for Iran, afforded
considerable protection of Saudi defense interests. This permitted the Saudis
to employ their version of "riyal politik" as the basis of their regional
diplomatic relations. The Iranian Revolution shattered the illusion of a
stable military balance in the Gulf and forced the Saudis to extend the
objectives of their military build-up to include the formation of an Arab Gulf
security arrangement.248
The primary constraints facing the Saudi military are demographic. Saudi
Arabia has a value in terms of strategic importance and wealth
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disproportionate to the size of the indigenous population, around 6 to 7
million. Saudi Arabia's skilled manpower base and the competition between the
military and civilian sectors for that base limits the capabilities of the
Saudi military. Therefore, its role is focused more as a deterrent force from
large attack and a defensive force to counter limited incursions.
This section will look at two aspects of the Sagdi military. First,
certain missions must be fulfilled. The nature and extent of Saudi military
missions will be examined, including a statement of general security interests
and a description of the geographical areas which the military must defend.
Since the relatively small Saudi military requires high technology weapons and
organizational stability to fulfil modern military missions, the structure and
weapons acquisitions of the Saudi land, naval and air forces will be
emphasized.
4.6.1 Saudi Security and Military Policies
Protecting Saudi Arabia from both external attack and subversion is the
primary objective of the military. Officially, Saudi defense capabilities are
intended to "constitute a deterrent factor and a means of protecting our
territory and our achievements as well as a means of protecting the natural
rights of the citizens of the Arab and Muslim world."249  In addition, Saudi
policy seeks to "keep the region free from the superpower's influence and
conflicts and preserve its nonaligned status." 250  Concern over the
superpowers partially reflects the "growth of the Soviet naval force that
could be employed to interdict sea lanes vital to the Western alliance and its
dependence on Saudi oil" which has "convinced Saudi Arabian defense officials
that the USSR aims to isolate" the Saudis. 251 Some Saudis also fear the
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possibilities of a US military intervention to "secure" the oil fields.
Perceptions of regional threats have already been discussed. Possible military
threats are seen in Israel, Iran, Iraq, North and South Yemens, and even
Egypt. 252  There are also internal security roles which concern branches of
the military. The holy cities and the oil fields are especially important in
this regard.
Addressing security concerns in a broader context, Crown Prince Abdullah
Ibn Abd al-'Aziz stated that "Saudi Arabia is a source of protection for the
Arab nations. Saudi Arabia wants to develop its armed forces with the aim of
introducing greater security and peace to the Gulf. The region must distance
itself from tensions resulting from the Iran-Iraq war. The continuation of
this explosive situation could give grounds to foreign intervention. "253
The Saudis thus perceive a clear linkage between regional and global
security questions. Regional instabilities can either be caused by superpower
competition or at least can invite intervention. In this sense, security
cannot be guaranteed only by Saudi military force, but must involve broader
regional cooperation to protect against foreign exploitation of differences in
Gulf countries' interests, Regional cooperation could bring together local
interests, contributing more to Saudi security. It is this role which the GCC
is intended to play.
Despite this role, bilateral military cooperation,in particular
Saudi-Pakistani and Saudi-US cooperation, fundamentally complements these
efforts at regional cooperation. The latter, as has been mentioned, seeks to
achieve political legitimacy and a convergence of regional interests. The
former, on the other hand, lends muscle to the Saudi position. Actual
military strength is gained from Saudi Arabia's extra-regional associations.
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Pakistan officially supports the goal of mapping out a joint military
strategy in the Gulf and sees Saudi Arabia as playing an essential and central
role in that strategy.254 Although Pakistan is not a Gulf state, it is
Islamic and conservative. Since the overthrow of the Shah, it has shared
similar Gulf security interests as Saudi Arabia from the viewpoint of wanting
to avoid regional instabilities which might present opportunities for foreign-
especially Soviet- intervention. Pakistan is clearly sensitive since Khomeini
has also called for the overthrow of the Zia government. 2 55 An additional
worry for Pakistan is the Soviet role in Afghanistan. In addition, both
Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have expressed disappointment and distrust in the
reliability of US security commitments in view of the indecisive Carter
years. Thus, both nations have incentives for securing more American
assistance while organizing joint/regional arrangements explicitly not
dependent on a US role. 256
Current roles for Pakistani military personnel in Saudi Arabia could
include supplementing Saudis in the National Guard, in the Royal Saudi Air
Force or in air defense units. If such roles were accepted by Pakistan, the
advantage to Saudi Arabia would follow from the political loyalty of Pakistani
military personnel to the Saudi government. But in addition to the internal
security role, Pakistani assistance in operating advanced weapons and in
training would also be beneficial.
Saudi-US military cooperation is extensive. Although Saudi Arabia will
not permit US bases on its territory and is reportedly cool to the US rapid
deployment force proposal ,257 cooperation ranges from arms trade and
training to a consultative joint military committee.258 While defending its
general cooperation with the US in response to criticisms even within the
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Gulf, 259 the Saudis downplay the importance of military ties, especially
deemphasizing anything akin to joint military planning. 260  The general
relationship of Saudi security interests with those of the US and USSR is
discussed below; for purposes here, the military and training programs are
more important.
Attempting to match military missions with arms acquisitions and military
training programs presents a couple of difficulties. First, the state of the
art of defense planning may lack sophistication, thus poorly mapping the
military missions onto the force structure. Saudi defense planners, for
example, may not identify threats, propose possible options and plan to deal
with these threats based on the configuration of available forces. Instead,
the methodology may be less systematic, acquiring different types of arms and
creating a force structure in reaction to several threat concepts, i.e., broad
contingencies which could occur, but may not be probable given a sober
analysis of existent military threats. 261
An effort to deter broadly defined threats might dictate a policy of
purchasing high visibility weapons, for example, "the acquisition of prestige
aircraft that may have a great deterrent value than combat value in the Saudi
environment." 262  In addition, high technology weapons are an answer to the
manpower shortage- they are intended to have a high multiplier value. This,
of course, places a high reliance on the "ability of Gulf personnel to absorb
and use the most sophisticated weapons in a record time." 263
The sheer magnitude of the current Saudi military buildup, with its
emphasis on integration of the command, control, communications and
intelligence (C31) missions, suggests greater reliance on fulfiling combat
roles rather than advertising the prestige of military forces. Indeed,
-81-
increasing the deterrent value of Saudi military forces is an objective and it
is best accomplished, reflecting US military advice, by enhancing the combat
value of the forces present. "The goal of Saudi Arabia is to develop a
credible deterrent to defend itself against regional threats and to assist its
Gulf council neighbors in protecting themselves. " 264
Saudi Arabia's arms acquisition program is perhaps the most active in the
developing world. Military expenditures have grown from $6.8 billion in 1975
to over $27 billion in 1982.265 Sales of equipment have risen for every
branch of service. Before examining the current state of arms acquisitions in
Saudi Arabia, we will consider first the structure of the military and their
missions, as an introduction to assessing the rationale for arms purchases.
Yet, up until recently, much of the Saudi military expenditure has been
earmarked for infrastructure development. Acquisition of sophisticated arms
is therefore the next logical step in its military modernization program.266
4.6.2 Military Structure and Missions
The Saudi military is directly administered by the Royal Family.267
Members of the Royal Family serve as the Minister of Defense, deputies, Chief
of Air Operations and National Guard Commander, for example. The military
structure is divided into the regular armed services and the National Guard.
The National Guard consists of 25,000 personnel organized into 44
infantry battalions and other special units. 268 National Guard personnel
are almost entirely Bedouin in background from the Nejd Province where the
Saud family originated and, it is assumed, are intensely loyal to the Saud
family.269 The National Guard is assigned to protect the oil fields, the
holy cities and to guard against coup or insurrection of the regular armed
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forces. 270
Recently, the National Guard participated in the al-Yamanah maneuvers,
whose goal was to repel a night attack on the outskirts of Riyadh. 271 The
counterattack required National Guard reconnaissance units to obtain
information from local citizens, then to coordinate the combined arms attack.
Heavy artillery, tanks and aircraft supported the National Guard infantry
units. The exercise permitted the National Guard to practice rapid
mobilization, logistics and C3 coordination. The goal of the maneuver is
more interesting. The National Guard's purpose in the exercise was not to
engage the enemy in sustained combat. The objective of the counterattack was
thus not to encircle the attacking enemy force, but to force it to retreat and
withdraw.272 What makes this interesting is that the enemy force was
apparently assumed to have infantry units and tanks as well, and that little
coordination between the National Guard and the regular services occurred
during the exercise. Reading between the lines, the exercise could well have
been designed to defeat a coup attempt.
The regular armed forces consist of an army, navy and air force. The
army has 35,000 personnel and consists of two armored brigades, two mechanized
brigades, two infantry brigades, an airborne brigade, five artillery
battalions and a Royal Guard regiment. 273 The navy has 2500 personnel and
two fleet headquarters at Jiddah and Al Qatif/Jubail. Other bases are at Ras
Tanura, Damman, Yanbu and Ras al Mishab. The air force has 14,000 personnel
and 170 combat aircraft. 274
All branches of service have undergone and continue to undergo
modernization. Past developments are well documented; thus this presentation
will concentrate on current improvements. 275 Saudi Arabia, like other Gulf
countries, claims to adhere to a policy of diversification of arms sources.
The Saudis are very sensitive about the role of foreign advisers and are quick
to assert that no foreign ideologies or bases are linked with the arms
sources. Saudi sensitivity on this issue causes it to be advertised as a
primary objective during the military buildup. 276
Currently, the National Guard is being outfitted with modern
communications, after having been mechanized and its mobility increased. 277
The United Kingdom is especially involved in improving the military
communications network of the National Guard. A recent $340 million contract
was signed to build ground stations for satellites, radio links and training
programs.278 Although evidence is lacking, this program might be linked to
a French-Saudi contract under which Aerospatiale is building three space
satellites and ground based receiving stations for the Arab satellite program
ARABSAT.279
A broad command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) program
is underway for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). One objective is to tie
this C3I system into a nationwide network linking the RSAF with the Royal
Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) and the Royal Saudi Naval Forces (RSNF) commands.
Such a program is estimated to cost $3.8 billion and would require 17 radars
deployed around the periphery of Saudi Arabia. 280 The tie-in with the RSLF
also will be linked to the Hawk air defense missile system in six nationwide
air defense regions. This is a five year program.281 Pursuant to its
policy of achieving technical independence, the Saudis want this C3 program
to be the initial stage of a high technology transfer process leading to an
integrated circuit production industry. 282
Table 3
RSAF Modernization Program*
US Weapon Systems
number cost comments
F-1 5 McDonnell -Douglas 62
F-5 Northrop
E-3A AWACS
KC-707
tankers
KC-707
ELINT
C-130
transport
AIM-9L
Sidewinder
129
5Boeing
Boeing
Boeing
Lockheed
6
2
46
Raytheon-Ford 1177
$2.85 b -air superiority mission;
-incl. training, support;
-1 sqd at Dhahran on PG; 1
at Taif on Red Sea; 1 at
Khamis Mushalt in s.w. SA
$3.8 b -incl. training, support;
-RSAF assumes most mainten-
ance for F-5s
$5.8 b -to operate from Al Kharj,
35 mi S of Riyadh;
-4 now operated by USAF;
$2.4 b -to be delivered by 3-87
-electronic intelligence
missions
-43 now in inventory, 3 on
order
$200 m -heat seeking AAM
-improved for look-up/look-
down capability
Raytheon-Gen'1
Dynamics
Hughes
-for 62 F-15s1000
2400 -for F-5s
-electro-optical guidance
* Sources: Aviation Week and Space Technology, SIPRI
weapon firm
AIM-7F
Sparrow
Maverick
ASM
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Air Force mddernization has progressed through a number of stages,
including $23 billion of construction of five major air bases and support
facilities and $14 billion for military city complexes. The emphasis now is
on weapons acquisition. High priority weapons include the US F-15 air
superiority fighters, F-5 fighters, E-3A airborne warning and control system
(AWACS) aircraft, KC-707 tanker aircraft, C-130 transports, the AIM-9L
air-to-air missile (AAM), the AIM-7F and the Maverick ASM. See Table 3.
The F-15 air superioriy fighter is probably the best of its type in the
world. Capable of flight speeds of 2000 mph, the F-15 in an interceptor
mission has a range of up to 900 miles. It can carry up to 15,000 pounds of
bombs in a ground attack configuration, but this is a poor use of the F-15,
compared for example with the F-16. The F-15 radar can spot targets 50 miles
away and can guide its four Sparrow AAM up to 20 miles. The aircraft houses a
20 mm cannon and carries four Sidewinder AAM. An important feature for the
Saudis is the easy maintenance requirements for the F-15. The plane is
designed for quick maintenance as well, requiring only 20 minutes for an
engine replacement. The on-board electronic equipment is modularized making
replacement easy.283 The F-5 has a top speed of around 1000 mph and a range
of up to 650 miles. It is designed for dogfights, is of low cost and is easy
to maintain.
The AIM-9L Sidewinder is a short range air-to-air missile utilizing
infrared homing to track enemy aircraft. This missile can be used from any
angle of attack, including head-on, a decisive advantage in close combat. Its
heat sensing technology is very sensitive, capable even of homing on air
friction on the wings of another aircraft. Together with the fast F-15, the
AIM-9L is intended to fulfil an air defense-interceptor role.
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This array of high technology weapons systems is mostly a response to
regional and extraregional threats which require quick reactions to short
warning time air engagements possibly spread over large geographical
distances. This point is particularly relevant in the Middle East and the
Gulf region where short flight times between potential adversaries has caused
a strong precedent for pre-emptive strikes. This is the rationale, for
example, for the Saudi interest in ring laser gyros (RLG) inertial navigation
equipment. Installing RLGs in F-5s can decrease scramble time from 2.5
minutes to 22 seconds. 284 With this decreased reaction time, more flight
time can be used to prepare for a combat engagement, increasing the
single-shot kill probability of an AIM-9L launch and increasing the chances
for two launches per sortie against the attacker.285 Continuous combat air
patrol during times of crisis is another solution to the time problem.
Finally, airborne reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures and electronic
intelligence capabilities are important. This is provided by the E-3A AWACS
and the KC-707 ELINT aircraft.
The Saudi government is committed to defense of a geographical band
extending across the center of the country from the Red Sea to the Gulf. This
defense perimeter contains Mecca, Medina, Jeddah, Taif, the Najd, Riyadh, the
al Hasa eastern province along the Gulf and all major airfields except
Tabuk. 286 See Figure 1. This band is considered to be essential for
national survival. In the Gulf, the Fahad line is the demarcation beyond
which all unidentified aircraft approaching Saudi Arabia are considered to be
hostile for purposes of interception by Saudi fighters. 28 7 This line runs
from the Abadan area on the Iran-Iraq border along the middle of the Gulf to
the Strait of Hormuz.
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The normal peacetime situation has- two F-5Es and two F-15Cs on a five
minute alert at the Dharan airbase near the Gulf. This base also has Hawk SAM
batteries, Shahine Crotale SAMs and air defense guns. The other F-15s and
some F-5s are hangared in hardened shelters, a precaution reflecting the fact
that it is this base which would receive the heaviest attack in an assault on
the eastern province oil facilities. AWACS are linked with the base,
directing the interceptor missions.
In Figure 2, a hypothetical Iranian attack scenario is depicted. 288
Within 16 minutes from its home base at Bushehr, an Iranian Phantom could
reach its target at the Ras Tanura oil facility. The Phantom would cross the
Fahad line approximately eight minutes from the target. Figure 3 shows the
sequence of events for an F-15 from Dharan (187 miles from Bushehr) to
intercept, with the assistance of only ground based radar and no AIM-9L
armament. Up to 13 minutes are required to detect an incoming, low flying
aircraft due to the limited (30 to 50 miles of low altitude) coverage of the
289radar. The scenario suggests that three minutes are required to identify
the aircraft as hostile and to decide to intercept. For argument's sake,
assume this process is nearly instantaneous. The plausibility of this
assumption rests on the fact that the Fahad line was crossed, so the aircraft
would be assumed to be hostile. However, if scrambling takes five minutes and
the intercept up to four minutes, reflecting the required time to vector the
fighter and engage without the AIM-9L, then the defending and attacking
fighters would meet and engage after the oil facility had been hit. With the
AIM-9L, the intercept time is postulated to be two minutes. With the AWACS,
detection time is effectively zero. Intercept and combat can then occur
comfortably before the target is threatened. See Figure 4. Some distances
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from selected points to Saudi airbases are listed in Figure 5.
This scenario illustrates the mission of the Saudi air force:
.. to modernize to the point where it could maintain a fighter screen
over its oil fields and other Southern Gulf countries with sufficient
effectiveness to act as a major deterrent to any air attacks on the
oil fields and give its army significant air cover in a defensive
role or similar air cover to other Gulf forces. By the mid 1980s, the
AWACS package should also give the Saudi Arabian air force enough
effectiveness to coordinate the use of up to 100-150 additional
fighters from the other conservative Gulf nations in a defense of the
Southern Gulf coast and the oil facilities in the Gulf.290
Faults do exist in the system, however. In 1982 a defecting Iranian F-4
Phantom flew across the Gulf, directly over the Ras Tanura oil facility, and
entered its landing pattern just as the intercepting F-5s were taking off.
The problem here was reportedly that the covering AWACS was at the far end of
its orbit. Another incident involved a defecting crew in a 707 Iranian cargo
plane which flew across the Gulf, across Saudi territory and into Cairo
airport without being detected. 291 The RSAF, however, regularly practices
intercepting simulated attacks on oil facilities with English Lightning
fighters simulating MiG-21s armed with Soviet Atoll AAM. 292
Both the RSLF and RSNF also are being modernized. Stationed mostly near
border areas, one problem facing the land forces has been lack of mobility.
The RSAF is upgrading five of its 747 transports to carry armor, artillery and
air defense weapons throughout the country. C-130 aircraft are available now
for RSLF transport.293 The Saudis are also expected to participate in the
McDonnell Douglas C-17 advanced cargo aircraft program.
To enhance the armored capabilities of the RSLF, the US hopes to provide
the M-2 Bradley armored personnel carrier and the M-1 Abrams tank. Saudi tank
crews arrived in the US for training on the M-1, while negotiations for the
sale of up to 1200 continued. 294
Table 4
Saudi Armed Forces
Growth in Force Structure
1973-74 1978-79 1983
Armored Bgd. 1 bn. 1 2 (1 forming)
Airborne Bgd. -- -- 1
Para. bn. 1 2 2
Spec. forces rgnt. -- 3 3
Mechanized Bgd. -- 2
Infantry Bgd. 4 2-4 (some being 2 (1 to be
mechanized) mechanized)
Royal Guard Bn. 1 1 3
Tanks 120 350 450
APCs/MICVs 200+ 550 1370
Artillery 90 300 --
art. bn. 3 3 5
Combat a/c 70-90 130-178 170
Transports 11 45 72
Helicopters 40 52-60 64
SAM batteries 11 11 18
Naval vessels 24/8 120/10 17/16
(FAC-PB/Other)
Key: Bgd. = brigade
Para. bn. = paratroober battalion
Spec. forces rgmt. = special forces regiment
APCs/MICVs = armored personnel carriers/mechanized infantry combat vehicle
art. bn. = artillery battalions
a/c = aircraft
SAM = surface-to-air missile
FAC/PB = fast attack craft/patrol boats (note: the 1978-79 figure of 120
includes small coastal PB not counted in other year totals)
Sources: Arab Military Strength, June 1978 (Jerusalem, Israel Information
Center) and International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance,
1974-75, 1978-79 and 1983-84.
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The RSNF is charged with protection of the Saudi coastline, the Red Sea
and Gulf shipping lanes. The naval mission is dictated by four factors.295
First, Saudi Arabia is located on a peninsula with over 1300 miles of
coastline. The waterways surrounding Saudi Arabia are militarily and
politically strategic, including the Gulf of Aqaba, the Red Sea, the Horn of
Africa, the Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean and the Gulf. The naval bottlenecks in
the area require particular security attention. Here, the important spots are
the Strait of Tiran, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bgb al-Mandeb and the
Strait of Hormuz. Finally, of course, oil trade requires defense of the
shipping lanes in the region.
The RSNF is engaged in an $8 billion modernization program, about half of
which is for naval base construction at Jeddah and on the Gulf.296  Plans
for expansion include an increase from 2500 to 4500 personnel by the mid 1980s
and to build up to a 34 ship fleet with 24 attack helicopters.297 Future
missions are to include antisubmarine warfare, and antisurface and antiair
operations from the Gulf into the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and eastern
Mediterranean.
A large Saudi-French naval deal includes a $3.5 billion purchase of four
2600 ton displacement destroyers armed with OTOMAT ship-to-ship missiles
(ShShM) and Crotale ShAM. Each destroyer will carry the Dauphin-2
antisubmarine helicopter. These destroyers will be delivered between July
1984 and January 1986. Other Dauphin-2 helicopters will be armed with AS-15
AShM for anti-ship missions. A new $2.12 billion agreement has been kept
mostly secret, except for an intended sale of two Atlantic naval
reconnaissance and long range ship interdiction aircraft. The Atlantic can
remain on station for 8 to 12 hours covering a distance of 2500 miles. 298
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There is an emphasis on air defense systems, naval surveillance and
C3I, all important components of the kind of coordinated defense regime
which might emerge from the GCC. Of all the GCC countries, only Saudi Arabia
is acquiring sufficient amounts of sophisticated equipment and weapons to
manage an integrated Gulf rapid deployment force, or a Gulf air defense
network, or an integrated air, land, naval command. Thus, any step in the
direction of integrating these functions enhances the prestige and power of
the Saudis in the Gulf.
The Saudis face an increasingly militarized environment and are
responding with their own defense modernization program. They are developing
basically a two-faceted program. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia intends to
develop a sufficient force structure both to deter regional aggression by
raising the potential military cost and to combat actively any attacks on
itself or other GCC members. Available evidence is not suggestive that either
Saudi Arabia alone or the GCC collectively intends to develop a force
structure capable of waging sustained combat in the near future. Manpower,
logistics, equipment and communications are simply insufficient to fulfil this
role.
In addition, if the Saudis can -develop the military structure necessary
to contain internal and regional problems, especially in a political framework
like the GCC within which its interventions in other Gulf states would be
legitimized, it can manage the presence of the superpowers in the region. The
Saudis rely on the US, but too close of an association is a political
liability for them. Thus, they want the US RDF "over-the-horizon" security
guarantee without an attendant US military presence.
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5.0 Closing Remarks
In this paper, we have examined the sources of internal instability in
the Gulf countries. Among the conflicts discussed were religious disputes
between Sunni and Shia, and fundamentalist movements within both, potential
political disputes between Arabs and Iranians, between Gulf citizens and
Palestinians and other foreign workers, and among different political groups
and interests in some of the Gulf countries.
In addition, we have examined sources of regional conflict. These
include various forms of interstate and interdynastic rivalries, especially
those related to access to resources, e.g., oil, mineral rights, etc.
Furthermore, the current political environment in the Gulf is marked by the
manipulation or incitement of domestic disturbances by states involved in
regional conflict.
It is with these observations in mind that we consider the original
hypothesis, that the main purpose of the GCC security framework is to fracture
the current linkage between internal (domestic) and regional threats. This
theme, and the propositions implied by it, have been consistent with the
analysis throighout the paper.
5.1 The Propositions
Acceptance of the propositions flows immediately from the analysis in
sections 3.0 and 4.0. Virtually the entire security emphasis as existing in
the GCC agreements is, to date, oriented toward improving police functions,
intelligence-sharing and the like. Even in this role, disagreement has slowed
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progress as Kuwait has objected to particular provisions, e.g., extradition of
criminals and free pursuit by the police/border patrols of one country into
the neighboring country.
Expansion of the security role of the GCC to coordinated national defense
clearly would depend on Saudi Arabia. In terms of military capability., the
Saudis are acquiring much more than any other GCC state. Perhaps more
critically, military coordination in the form of C31 would necessarily be
based in Riyadh. Only with the sophisticated capabilities being purchased by
the Saudis can the Gulf countries coordinate a region-wide air defense net,
for example. At best, however, such a capability cannot be achieved probably
not until the 1990s. The Saudis simply will not have enough operational
equipment and trained personnel before then. In addition, it is not likely
that the current political impasse in the GCC will be overcome soon enough
that there will be any coordinated military planning or large scale weapons
purchases in the next few years. Clearly, the GCC must resolve its ambiguous
relationship with the US and the West, at least to the satisfaction of
countries like Kuwait and the UAE. Otherwise, coordinated defense planning
will remain at the level of occasional exercises, cooperative rhetoric and
perhaps a limited divisioh of defense responsibilities among GCC states.
5.2 The Hypothesis
Recent historical efforts to coordinate Gulf defense policies created the
foundation for GCC cooperation. Given the political framework of the GCC,
based on the Saudi plan bilaterally approved with several neighboring states,
the major emphasis on defense development in the region is to deter military
aggression by neighboring states. The existence of the GCC serves to increase
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the uncertainty facing any potential aggressor whether it can isolate one Gulf
country militarily, as Iran has done to Kuwait most recently. The Saudi plan
provides for coordination in internal security matters, with military and
paramilitary forces in the Gulf countries being upgraded to deal with internal
instabilities.
Consequently, we can accept that the GCC serves to break the link between
internal and regional threats, but only in conjuction with the individual Gulf
state military modernization programs. However, we have also found that the
modernization programs and the existence of a cooperative framework in the
Gulf may act to remove justifications and to decrease incentives for direct
superpower military actions in the region. But this can be true only to the
extent that an effective and coordinated military capability of one or more
members of the GCC can protect the access of the West to regional oil
resources. If in any circumstance this cannot be guaranteed, then the West/US
may be compelled to rely on its own military forces. This point emphasizes
the limited utility of the current and near term GCC military capability for
coping with a wide range of contingencies, from a Soviet attack to local
terrorist action. As has been maintained, what GCC countries can do is to
deal with the terrorist/local disturbance scenario and limited military
attacks from within the region. While this is not insignificant and would
contribute to Gulf security, it does not eliminate the role of a US security
guarantee.
5.3 Final Statement and Caveats
An initial- question was whether the main purpose served by a GCC security
regime would be internal or regional. The answer is both. Many of the causes
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of internal security problems directly influence regional security relations
as well. Efforts by Saudi Arabia in 1981 to limit Gulf discussions to
internal security agreements reflected a dual objective. On the one hand,
focusing on internal security questions implied a greater chance of finding
consensus than if the larger questions of regional defense coordination were
initially pursued. On the other hand, by focusing on internal security- a
real concern of the Gulf states- the Saudis were able to undercut Iraqi
attempts to organize a regional association dominated by its military forces.
This comment prompts two key points for understanding the evolution of
the Gulf Cooperation Council as a security regime. First, Saudi policy is
oriented toward achieving internal and regional stability through regional and
domestic consensus and legitimacy. Contemporary Saudi state behavior, one
must keep in mind, is fundamentally motivated by its search for security.
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has a well established diplomatic history of
exercising its influence by winning over allies. Inherent limitations on its
power have traditionally placed Saudi Arabia more in a power-broker role in
the Arab world than in a leadership role.
This tradition persists in the development of the GCC. GCC security
interests are clearly skewed toward Saudi interests, but this is not
necessarily detrimental to Gulf interests. Exclusion of Iraq from the GCC,
for example, should be understood in this context. The Arab Gulf states, led
by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, are working to preserve the Hussein regime or, at
least, to preclude the ascension to power of a regime hostile to
Sunni-dominated, conservative monarchial regimes. This does not mean that
Saudi Arabia would necessarily share similar foreign policy goals with a
post-war Iraq, which will certainly strive to regain its former stature in the
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region. Today's friend can be tomorrow's enemy; in the case of Iraq, ceteris
parabis, it still will be a powerful neighbor vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia in a
post-war environment. Therefore, now is the best time for the Saudis to build
consensus without the input of Iraq. Thus, the big question is how to achieve
legitimacy.
This brings us to the second key point for understanding the evolution of
the GCC. This one focuses on the political downside of pursuing security
through the GCC framework. There is one important political liability for
Saudi Arabia, quite essential to the development of the GCC, but contradictory
to one of its basic tenets: the US. The real problem is not the anti-US or
the more general nonalignment rhetoric of the GCC. What Gulf countries like
Kuwait, owing to its internal social structure, want to avoid is the massive
subsystemic contact with the US that they would have to accept with the
requirements of broad defense coordination in the GCC. Saudi Arabia's
military program is largely dependent on US advisers and trainers. Extension
of the Saudi military strategy throughout the Gulf would certainly require
some degree of weapons standardization and compatibility, especially in the
critical C3 1 area.
A legitimacy issue is related to this problem as well. If the US is so
closely identified with the military capabilities of the major GCC states,
then how is the GCC to maintain its "nonaligned" status? This may not be a
problem for some Gulf states like Oman and Saudi Arabia who welcome some
regional US presence, but for other states like Kuwait and the UAE, the
implication of cooperating with US planners is undesirable. Furthermore, if a
coLntry like Kuwait is suspicious of US motives, then what conclusion must it
draw about Saudi motives which appear to be closely related to those of the
US?299
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The general point to be drawn from this discussion is the difficulty of
achieving a full consensus and therefore legitimacy on regional security,
despite a rhetoric and appearance of unity among the lower Arab Gulf states.
Without this consensus and legitimacy, the GCC can never attain the role of a
coordinated defense structure. That goal is materially possible; the issue
challenged here is whether the political opportunity is available.
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Notes
1.0 Introduction
1. The terms "Persian Gulf," "Arabian Gulf" and "Gulf" will be used
interchangeably throughout the text. Traditionally, we in the West have
referred to the Persian Gulf. However, among our current allies in the
region, the Arab Gulf states, it is referred to as the Arabian Gulf.
2. Including the following: fulfilling the general requirements as laid down
by the 1980 Carter Doctrine; blunting a Soviet land and airborne invasion
through Northern Iran with light and highly mobile units; occupying Saudi
and other Gulf oil field to "protect" them from falling to hostile
forces; waging protracted combat with heavily equipped infantry and
armored divisions in southern Iran to protect the approaches to the Gulf;
guaranteeing free navigation through the Strait of Hormuz; executing
limited nuclear strikes in Azerbaijan; or simply deterring any Soviet
advances by posing the threat of superpower conflict with the use of
tripwire American forces. See Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to the
Congress, Fiscal Year 1983 and Fiscal Year 1984.
3. See Joshua M. Epstein (1981), "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF
Deterrent," International Security, Fall, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 126-158.
Epstein develops several scenarios for US-Soviet combat, mainly in Iran.
However, there is little discussion of the expected attitudes of regional
countries and the anticipated activities of their military forces. Also
in the same issue is Dennis Ross (1981), "Considering Soviet Threats to
the Persian Gulf," pp. 159-180. This is a discussion of Soviet interests
and recent activities in the Gulf. W. Scott Thompson (1982), "The Persian
Gulf and the Correlation of Forces," International Security, Sumer, Vol.
7, No. 1, pp. 157-180. Thompson argues that the US strategic forces are
mainly responsible for deterring Soviet military moves into the Gulf, but
that a shift in the correlation of local conventional forces may undercut
this.
4. See Shahram Chubin (1982), Security in the Persian Gulf: The Role of
Outside Powers, Vol. 4, (London: International Institute for Strategic
Studies ), pp.' 111-114.
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